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Blinded by dizzying technical advances in surveillance, and 
by the politics of the post-September 11 emergency, Congress 
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appears poised to grant the twenty-first century equivalent of 
eighteenth century general warrants1—allowing the executive 
to conduct national security surveillance at will. Even if Con-
gress does not grant such sweeping discretion by statute, ar-
guably the modern general warrant is with us now, by order of 
the President. Just as English law permitted the searcher to 
“‘break into any shop or place suspected,’”2 the executive 
branch has invoked the specter of additional terrorist attacks 
against the United States to justify sweeping electronic surveil-
lance of Americans, without judicial approval and outside the 
bounds of any statute.3 Within days of September 11, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft stated that the Department of Justice 
would thereafter be guided by a “paradigm of prevention,” or 
preventive enforcement, where every resource would be devoted 
to early anticipation of potential terrorism plots.4 Over the last 
five years, the determination that the United States cannot 
wait until terrorist plots are fully developed and operational be-
fore they are stopped has become an established part of the 
counter-terrorism landscape,5 while the rise of preventive en-
forcement as a preferred counter-terrorism approach is a domi-
nant theme in the Department of Justice strategy statements.6 
 
 1. General warrants were given to agents of the Crown, permitting 
wholesale ransacking of the homes and businesses of political opponents. Fol-
lowing a history of such abuses under Charles I, the courts struck down gen-
eral warrants and Parliament proscribed them a year later. See William C. 
Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveil-
lance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2000). 
 2. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His 
Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 
WM. & MARY Q. 371, 381 (1980) (quoting Copy of Council Order, July 30, 1621, 
Earl de la Warr collection, in FOURTH REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS 312 (London, 1874)). 
 3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REDESIGNING DOJ TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTS 
OF TERRORISM: RESHAPING THE FBI’S PRIORITIES TO FOCUS ON ANTI-
TERRORISM (May 29, 2002), http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/ 
Redesigning_DOJ_to_Prevent_Terrorism.html (noting the extensive preven-
tive measures taken in response to the threat of terrorism). 
 4. See id. 
 5. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & U.S. HOUSE 
PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLI-
GENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS 
OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REP. NO. 107-351 & H.R. REP. NO. 107-792, at 33 
(2002) (noting key failures in preventative measures prior to the September 11 
attacks); Editorial, The Limits of Hindsight, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2003, at 
A10. 
 6. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS SINCE SEPT. 11, 2001, No. 06-590 (Sept. 5, 2006) 
BANKS_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM 
2007] THE DEATH OF FISA 1211 
 
One of the most useful tools available to the government to 
learn about terrorist plans before they mature has been the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).7 Whether the 
strategy is to arrest the targets of surveillance early, or to con-
tinue monitoring in the hopes that more serious and sophisti-
cated terrorists might enlist others as decoys or assets in a 
more concrete and more nearly operational plot, FISA permits 
the government to keep tabs on the targets without their ever 
knowing about the surveillance.8 
Enacted in 1978, FISA resulted from an inter-branch com-
promise. Until then, no president had ever conceded that the 
Congress could interpose any set of procedures to confine the 
constitutional discretion of the president to engage in electronic 
surveillance to protect the national security.9 However, begin-
ning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court recognized an emerging 
constitutional right of privacy that is implicated when govern-
ment conducts electronic surveillance, and courts began to limit 
warrantless electronic surveillance.10 Soon thereafter, the Wa-
 
[hereinafter DOJ, FACT SHEET], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 
2006/September/06_opa_590.html; Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., Pre-
pared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the World Affairs 
Council of Pittsburgh on Stopping Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice 
Department’s Power of Prevention (Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www 
.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060816.html (“[W]e need to gather 
enough information and evidence during our investigations to ensure a suc-
cessful prosecution, but we absolutely cannot wait too long, allowing a plot to 
develop to its deadly fruition.”); Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., Pre-
pared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the American 
Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
dag/speech/2006/dag_speech_060524.html (“The death and destruction of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 mandate a . . . preventative approach.”). 
 7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1862 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). 
FISA also prescribes the rules for collecting foreign intelligence information in 
the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f ). The Act thus has no bearing on the 
United States’ authority to conduct intelligence collection outside the United 
States. Although FISA procedures may be employed to conduct physical 
searches, this Article examines only the portions of FISA regulating electronic 
surveillance in the United States. 
 8. See id. §§ 1801–1862. 
 9. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that even in 1976, 
President Ford was attempting to submit a bill that would codify current ex-
ecutive branch practices). 
 10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967), superseded by 
statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 95-351, 
82 Stat. 212, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 
1455 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the Fourth Amendment warrant provision to 
electronic surveillance). 
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tergate scandal and follow-on investigations of surveillance 
abuses by the Nixon administration and the administrations of 
earlier Presidents emboldened Congress and persuaded Presi-
dents Ford and Carter to work toward a legislative scheme 
permitting secret electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
while providing for judicial involvement and congressional 
oversight to assure Americans that past abuses would not be 
repeated.11 
Five years after the September 11 attacks, FISA unraveled 
following the amendments to FISA made at the insistence of 
the executive branch.12 A series of events led to this state of af-
fairs. September 11 created an aura of emergency in the gov-
ernment, and the emergency and its politics determined a 
range of policy and law developments. Congress essentially 
ceded its role in crafting legislation and in national leadership, 
while the executive branch seized the initiative to fight the 
global war on terrorism at home and abroad with the tools it 
could fashion. With a few notable exceptions,13 the courts have 
also been sensitized to the emergency.14 
Meanwhile, even though the failures to share information 
before September 11 did not stem from inadequate authorities 
or from legal obstacles, inter-agency finger-pointing at the fail-
ure to stop the hijackers15 led to changes in the law to encour-
 
 11. S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 8–9 (1976), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3909–10. 
 12. See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
 13. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006) (finding that 
the military commissions established by presidential order violated congres-
sional statutory restrictions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) 
(holding that courts may inquire into the factual basis for the President’s de-
tention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 
2686, 2698 (2004) (holding that the federal district court had habeas corpus 
jurisdiction over Guantánamo Bay detainees’ lawsuits and rejecting the argu-
ment that it would be unconstitutional to interpret the statute to infringe 
upon the President’s powers as commander in chief ). 
 14. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006) (upholding the military detention of a U.S. citizen who 
was detained upon entering the United States unarmed and held in civilian 
custody at the time of military detention); MacWade v. Kelly, No. 
05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005), aff ’d, 
460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding based on compelling need a random 
container inspection program for New York City subways used to deter terror-
ist attacks). 
 15. See September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence 
Community: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 
29 (2002) (statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby 
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age information sharing.16 In 2002, relying on post-September 
11 changes to FISA that loosened the requirement that “the 
purpose” of FISA surveillance is pursuit of foreign intelli-
gence,17 the Department of Justice furthered the dismantling of 
one component of the 1978 FISA compromise—the “wall” pro-
cedures which ensured that prosecutors would not build their 
cases upon or have their cases tainted by unlawfully obtained 
evidence.18 A special court of appeals gutted this central prem-
ise of FISA when it upheld the Department’s new procedures 
permitting the use of FISA even when the primary objective of 
the planned surveillance is to find evidence to support a prose-
cution.19 
At the same time, the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act)20 and rewritten FBI guide-
lines21 modernized FISA to account for new technologies and 
changing tactics in the never-ending leap-frog of the technolo-
gies of detection and evasion.22 Despite the Bush 
administration’s proclaimed satisfaction with the new tools, 
they secretly circumvented the updated FISA procedures in 
undertaking a new domestic surveillance program through the 
National Security Agency (NSA)—the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (TSP). Although strong negative reactions followed 
the media release of the NSA story in December 2005,23 the 
administration has made legal arguments to justify not follow-
 
.pdf [hereinafter Hearing] (detailing the missed opportunities to share avail-
able information about the al Qaeda threat inside the United States before 
September 11). 
 16. William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Sur-
veillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1166 (2003). 
 17. Part III.A., infra, considers the effect of the change from “the purpose” 
to “a significant purpose” in FISA. 
 18. Banks, supra note 16, at 1167–68. 
 19. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), cert. 
denied, ACLU (2003). 
 20. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act (Pa-
triot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801–1862). 
 21. JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATT’Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE-
LINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM EN-
TERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
olp/generalcrimes2.pdf. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 23. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
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ing FISA while it supports amendments to the act that would 
eviscerate it.24 The administration has repeatedly stated that 
the TSP is limited to situations where one end of the communi-
cations captured is a known or reasonably suspected affiliate of 
al Qaeda, but those assurances are not subject to independent 
verification outside the executive branch.25 In any case, if the 
TSP can work around FISA for one programmatic purpose, it 
would be difficult to stop other such evasions of the FISA 
scheme. One way or the other, it looks like FISA is dead. 
This Article is a requiem for FISA, and a plea for our 
government to restore the constitutional values that FISA 
wisely straddled—promoting national security while safeguard-
ing civil liberties. FISA may have been doomed from the start 
because of its complex formulations regarding who the govern-
ment may target, how the government must construct the ap-
plications, and how the government must minimize its dis-
semination of information collected. Still, its core set of 
requirements, and the judicial procedures to enforce them, re-
mained in place until 2002.26 Even before September 11, and 
exponentially more so since then, a growing criminalization of 
terrorism-related activities has made the prosecutorial agenda 
a larger part of the sphere of electronic surveillance, and has 
accordingly further complicated the task of managing FISA im-
plementation.27 With the long list of amendments enacted in 
the Patriot Act in 2001, and some others before and since then, 
the original deal from 1978 may have collapsed under its own 
weight. Whether from its cumulative complexity, the challenges 
of new technologies, or the efforts of the Bush administration 
after September 11 to curtail and circumvent its provisions, the 
 
 24. See Letter from William E. Moschella, U.S. Assistant Att’y Gen., to 
Pat Roberts, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al. 3 (Dec. 22, 
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillance6.pdf 
(arguing that presidential actions were excepted from FISA “procedures”). The 
proposed amendments to FISA supported by the administration are described 
infra Part III.A. 
 25. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23 (noting the White House’s stated 
goals to disrupt terrorist plots and the secrecy with which the executive 
branch executed the new intelligence-gathering strategy); Letter from William 
E. Moschella to Pat Roberts et al., supra note 24, at 1. 
 26. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (allowing 
the expansion of FISA procedures). 
 27. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support 
Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–28 (2005) 
(outlining the emergence of the prevention strategy). For more on the growth 
of the FISA court docket see infra Part III.C. 
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central premise of the FISA compromise—authorizing secret 
electronic surveillance for the purpose of collecting foreign in-
telligence, but subjecting applications to judicial scrutiny and 
the entire process to congressional oversight28—has been lost. 
The change in the purpose requirement and dismantling of 
the procedural wall in 2002 all but eliminated the protection 
against skirting Fourth Amendment requirements when misus-
ing FISA to develop evidence for prosecution.29 FISA became 
something that it was never intended to be—an alternative to 
the traditional law enforcement procedures for building a 
criminal case against alleged terrorists that circumvents con-
stitutional requirements.30 The TSP is, in some ways, even 
worse. Unless the executive branch has the constitutional au-
thority to go around FISA, the TSP is a stark violation of limits 
on surveillance set by Congress.31 Instead of taking steps to 
reign in the NSA program, however, Congress is poised either 
to authorize open-ended and untargeted surveillance programs, 
or simply to make the FISA procedures optional.32 Even if Con-
gress takes no action to authorize or regulate the TSP, it will be 
acquiescing in electronic surveillance activities that lack statu-
tory authority.33 
Part I reviews the origins of FISA, the modern problems 
that demand secret surveillance capabilities, and the constitu-
tional and political backdrop for the legislation. It also briefly 
sets out the statutory provisions and its structure. Part II ex-
amines the practice under FISA before September 11, particu-
larly the developments that led to the erection of the wall be-
tween law enforcement and foreign intelligence. Part III 
reviews post-September 11 changes, focusing on the change in 
the Patriot Act that led to the dismantling of the requirement 
 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (stating that FISA is 
the “exclusive means” to conduct electronic surveillance); Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (es-
tablishing that it is a criminal offense to conduct electronic surveillance “ex-
cept as authorized by statute”). 
 29. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1174–84. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23 (describing the Bush admini-
stration’s circumvention of established, statutory-derived surveillance proce-
dures). 
 32. Part. IV.C. discuses the congressional response to the NSA program. 
 33. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 115–17 (1994) and William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 73–74 (1988) for the 
legal effects of congressional acquiescence to executive practices. 
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that “the purpose” of FISA-ordered surveillance be pursuit of 
foreign intelligence and the avoidance of FISA through the 
NSA TSP. These two developments lead inexorably to the un-
raveling of the 1978 FISA compromise and, thus, to the death 
of FISA. Part IV considers whether technological change makes 
FISA obsolete, and offers some tentative conclusions on the 
lawfulness of the TSP. Then I review some proposals to amend 
and perhaps save FISA while accommodating the TSP, al-
though the prominent efforts in the administration and Con-
gress to amend FISA to accommodate the NSA program and to 
make optional the use of FISA processes only make more likely 
the final days of FISA. 
I.  THE ORIGINS OF FISA   
Since our founding as a nation, the government has wor-
ried about espionage committed by hostile foreign agents.34 
More recently, the fear of terrorist attacks directed at the 
United States at home and abroad has overtaken foreign espio-
nage as the preeminent national security threat.35 To counter 
these threats, we have relied on many of the techniques used in 
everyday criminal investigations in pursuit of foreign intelli-
gence, including electronic surveillance, physical searches, and 
the use of undercover agents and informants.36 With the digital 
revolution, communications and surveillance technologies have 
grown explosively. The government can now watch and listen 
to telephone, e-mail, or Internet communication in almost any 
circumstance, and it can power through massive amounts of 
electronic data in search of relevant information almost instan-
taneously.37 The digital revolution does not enable government 
to collate or assess the importance of the enormous quantity of 
raw data, leaving that task constrained by human capacities 
and resources. Even though the amount of collected data that 
can be evaluated is a small percentage of what is collected, the 
available intelligence still dwarfs the pre-digital amount.38 
 
 34. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 10–17. 
 35. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 43–46 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/ 
2006 (discussing the transformation of the objections of national security insti-
tutions). 
 36. Banks, supra note 16, at 1151–52. 
 37. PATRICK J. MCMAHON, CONFERENCE RAPPORTEUR, COUNTERTERROR-
ISM TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 39–55 (2005). 
 38. See PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, CHATTER: DISPATCHES FROM THE SE-
BANKS_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM 
2007] THE DEATH OF FISA 1217 
 
Now that terrorism has overtaken espionage as the domi-
nant investigative concern in protecting the national security, 
we have come to realize that terrorism presents difficult chal-
lenges in our legal culture. Experience has shown that our 
criminal laws and traditional law enforcement methods cannot 
provide sufficient protection against terrorism.39 Arrest and 
prosecution have proven successful in some instances, some-
times before and at other times after the planned terrorist 
act,40 but the risk that grave harm may occur from a terrorist 
attack—another September 11, for example, or a biological 
weapons attack—forces us to look for other preventive tools. 
Over time, these investigative techniques have anticipated and 
prevented many plots that would have harmed Americans.41 
Consider these examples: 
In 1982, as part of an ongoing investigation of Armenian 
terrorist groups, FBI agents in Los Angeles monitored a court-
authorized electronic surveillance of a home in Santa Monica, 
trying to learn more about a suspected plot by an Armenian 
group to bomb the Honorary Turkish Consulate in Philadel-
phia.42 During the course of the surveillance, the FBI learned 
that the targets of the surveillance were building a bomb.43 Al-
though the plotters managed to transport dynamite inside 
checked luggage on board a United States commercial airliner, 
the suspects were arrested before the bomb was moved to its 
intended target.44 Criminal convictions were obtained, and the 
evidence at trial included tape recordings and logs of the elec-
tronic surveillance that had been undertaken for the purpose of 
obtaining foreign intelligence.45 
In 1981, U.S. citizens affiliated with the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) sought out a seller of surveillance and 
 
CRET WORLD OF GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING 123–25 (2005) (describing the role of 
human intervention in prioritizing the evaluation of raw intelligence data). 
 39. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 8–10 (noting that the goal of 
national security—to prevent criminal activity before it occurs—is difficult to 
reconcile with criminal law legal standards). 
 40. See Chesney, supra note 27, at 26–47. 
 41. Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism Before the S. 
Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judici-
ary, and Related Agencies, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, 
U.S. Att’y Gen.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2001/ 
ag_statement_05_09_01.htm. 
 42. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 962. 
 45. Id. at 962, 964–65. 
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counter surveillance equipment, identified themselves as mem-
bers of the PIRA, and explained that they wanted to use the 
equipment they would purchase against the British in North-
ern Ireland.46 The merchant informed the FBI of this and sub-
sequent conversations, and the FBI began to conduct electronic 
surveillance of the home telephone of one of the PIRA mem-
bers.47 Over time, the surveillance revealed efforts by the target 
and others affiliated with the PIRA to obtain weapons, includ-
ing surface-to-air (SAM) missiles.48 Before their deals were con-
summated, four PIRA members were arrested and convicted of 
conspiracy and weapons-related charges, based in part on the 
fruits of the electronic surveillance.49 
In 1992, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) de-
tained Mohammed Hammoud, a citizen of Lebanon, when he 
attempted to enter the United States using fraudulent docu-
ments.50 While his application for asylum was pending, Ham-
moud earned permanent resident status by marrying a United 
States citizen.51 In the mid-1990s, Hammoud, along with his 
wife, a brother, and his cousins became involved in cigarette 
smuggling.52 During the same period, Hammoud began leading 
weekly prayer services for Shi’a Muslims in the Charlotte, 
North Carolina area, where he urged attendees to donate 
money to Hezbollah, an organization founded by Lebanese 
Shi’a Muslims that provides humanitarian aid to Shi’a Muslims 
and supports terrorism in opposition to Israel and to the United 
States presence in the Middle East.53 Hammoud was charged 
and convicted of providing material support to a designated 
foreign terrorist organization, along with collateral crimes, in-
cluding money laundering, credit card fraud, and transporta-
tion of contraband cigarettes, in part based on evidence from 
recorded telephone conversations between Hammoud and oth-
ers.54 
 
 46. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 47. Id. at 65–66. 
 48. Id. at 66. 
 49. Id. at 67. 
 50. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 326. 
 54. Id. at 326–27. 
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From December 2001 until August 2003, Hemant Lakhani 
met several times in person and had telephone conversations 
with an FBI informant who posed as an arms dealer.55 In 2005, 
a New Jersey federal jury convicted Hemant Lakhani, an In-
dian-born United Kingdom national, for attempting to provide 
material support to terrorists and for his role in trying to sell 
an anti-aircraft missile to a man whom he believed represented 
a terrorist group intent on shooting down a United States 
commercial airliner.56 Recordings of the conversations and 
meetings became part of the evidence in the criminal case 
against Lakhani.57 
At its most effective, electronic surveillance captures con-
versations and movements about plans to commit a terrorist 
act and thus allows the government to step in before the crime 
occurs. Of course, electronic surveillance may also impose a 
heavy cost. An array of personal privacy and expressive free-
dom interests are threatened by electronic surveillance, espe-
cially surveillance that is undertaken on a long-term, 24/7 ba-
sis.58 Those who know or suspect the government of monitoring 
their conversations self-censor their conversations, inhibiting 
free-flowing expression.59 Individual interests in anonymity are 
compromised, as are self-determination choices and freedom of 
association.60 As the Supreme Court has noted, electronic sur-
veillance for national security purposes may also implicate a 
“convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not pre-
sent in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime,” when it targets those whose 
activities are politically motivated.61 Government interests may 
be stronger in these areas, but there is also a greater risk of 
jeopardizing protected expression.62 
The use of traditional law enforcement techniques brings 
along with it traditional Fourth Amendment requirements, in-
cluding the need to establish that a crime has been committed 
 
 55. Complaint at 1, United States v. Lakhani, Mag. No. 03-7106 (D.N.J. 
2003); This American Life: The Arms Trader, Episode 292 (WBEZ Chicago 
television broadcast July 8, 2005), available at http://www.thislife.org/pages/ 
descriptions/05/292.html. 
 56. This American Life: The Arms Trader, supra note 55. 
 57. Complaint, supra note 55, at 1–8. 
 58. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491–
99 (2006). 
 59. Id. at 495. 
 60. See id. at 491–99. 
 61. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 62. Id. 
BANKS_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM 
1220 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1209 
 
or is imminent before a judge will issue a warrant to conduct 
electronic surveillance.63 Because of the gravity of the threat of 
terrorism and the consequences of those acts, the government 
has sought the authority to undertake surveillance with some-
thing less than the criminal law standard.64 The grave danger 
of international terrorism arguably justifies the more permis-
sive FISA regime, and the privacy intrusions are limited to the 
collection of information for foreign intelligence purposes. At 
the same time, foreign intelligence collection tends to be pro-
grammatic, focusing on nascent schemes and following up on 
ambiguous leads.65 In addition, terrorists in a loosely defined 
cell structure are hard to identify in general, and they are typi-
cally trained not to engage in criminal conduct that would jus-
tify the criminal variant of electronic surveillance.66 Ordinary 
crimes electronic surveillance requires that an application for a 
warrant contain detailed information about the alleged crimi-
nal offense, the facilities and communication sought to be inter-
cepted, the identity of the target (if known), the period of time 
sought for the surveillance, and an explanation of whether 
other investigative methods could achieve the objective.67 
The need for secrecy and the often more open-ended pur-
pose of monitoring a target for foreign intelligence makes the 
ordinary crimes warrant procedures ill-suited for foreign intel-
ligence gathering.68 Clearly, something less than a completed 
act of international terrorism should be required before launch-
ing electronic surveillance in pursuit of foreign intelligence.69 
However, deciding just how much evidence of a connection of a 
potential target to a terrorist group or to terrorist activities 
should be required is a nettlesome problem.70 Without suffi-
 
 63. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–2520 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 64. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 8–10 (discussing the differences in 
the legal standards for surveillance of terrorism and ordinary crimes investi-
gations). 
 65. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1148 (discussing new legislative tools to 
facilitate intelligence-gathering and analysis). 
 66. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution 
and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 427–28 
(2007) (describing the challenges of dealing with unaffiliated terrorists). 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)–(d) (2000). 
 68. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 5–10. 
 69. Id. at 7, 9 (noting that national security investigations are based on 
different probable cause standards than criminal investigations as a result of 
their unique objectives). 
 70. Id. at 5–10. 
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cient controls, electronic surveillance is an especially ominous 
form of investigation because, in a digital world, it records and 
may store and retrieve forever not just the information that in-
vestigators seek but everything that the target communicates, 
no matter how unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance.71 
The metaphor commonly associated with electronic surveil-
lance is the net that captures everything.72 If not leavened with 
controls, electronic surveillance may become the contemporary 
equivalent of the eighteenth century English general warrants.
 The general warrant was abandoned in England, but Eng-
lish law did not recognize a right of privacy.73 As similar over-
reaching by Crown agents persisted in the colonies through the 
use of writs of assistance, colonists lacked a legal remedy.74 It 
was thus hardly a surprise that the Bill of Rights would include 
in the Fourth Amendment protection against the abuses of 
general warrants.75 
Of course the Framers could not foresee the problems that 
would arise in adapting the Fourth Amendment to electronic 
surveillance. How should its two clauses—the protection 
against “unreasonable searches and seizures”76 and the war-
rant requirement77—apply to electronic surveillance? Must 
pursuit of foreign intelligence follow the Fourth Amendment 
rules at all, if undertaken inside the United States? If the 
Fourth Amendment does not offer clear guidance, may Con-
gress legislate to implement and clarify its requirements for 
gathering information about international terrorism? 
Applied to the gathering of foreign intelligence, electronic 
surveillance offers these same advantages of being able to 
watch and listen without limitation and to learn about espio-
nage or terrorist activities that may be only in the planning 
stages. As electronic surveillance became a common tool of law 
enforcement, so did it enter the world of intelligence investiga-
tions in the United States, first by the FBI and then later by 
 
 71. Solove, supra note 58, at 491–99. 
 72. Id. at 495 (noting that electronic surveillance also records behavior 
and social interaction). 
 73. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 3. 
 74. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 29–30 (1970). 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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the CIA and other intelligence agencies.78 As countering terror-
ism became a central national security challenge, the investiga-
tive community was faced with the reality that its purpose in 
investigating might simultaneously be gathering foreign intel-
ligence and enforcing the criminal laws.79 While the rules for 
the two types of investigation look very much alike, they differ 
in some important respects, and they historically remained 
separate from one another, to protect the integrity of each 
one.80 
Only in 1967 did the Supreme Court hold that the Fourth 
Amendment warrant clause applies to electronic surveillance.81 
In Katz v. United States, the Court also held that warrantless 
searches “are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few spe-
cifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”82 At the 
time, no foreign intelligence or national security exception had 
been so recognized, although the Katz Court expressly declined 
to extend its holding to cases “involving the national secu-
rity.”83 In 1968, Congress responded to Katz and enacted legis-
lation creating procedures for judicial authorization of elec-
tronic surveillance in law enforcement investigations,84 but the 
legislation explicitly noted that Congress did not intend to set 
rules for national security investigations.85 
In 1972, the Supreme Court addressed electronic surveil-
lance in a national security setting for the first time. In United 
States v. United States District Court (Keith),86 defendants 
charged with conspiring to bomb a CIA office in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, sought in pretrial proceedings electronic surveillance 
logs that the government had obtained without a warrant.87 
The government admitted that a warrantless wiretap had in-
 
 78. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 19–31. 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 9 (noting that terrorism is the exception to the general 
rule). 
 80. Id. at 8–9. 
 81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), superseded by statute, 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 95-351, 82 Stat. 
212, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 82. Id. at 358. 
 83. Id. at 358 n.23. 
 84. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)). 
 85. § 802, 82 Stat. at 214 (repealed 1978). 
 86. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). This case is typically known as the Keith deci-
sion, after Damon Keith, the district court judge who presided over the case. 
 87. Id. at 299–300. 
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tercepted conversations involving the defendants,88 but it de-
fended the wiretap on the basis of the Constitution and a dis-
claimer in the 1968 Crime Control Act.89 
The Court first rejected the statutory argument.90 The gov-
ernment argued that the provision of the 1968 Crime Control 
Act regulating electronic surveillance for domestic law en-
forcement purposes that excluded from its coverage surveil-
lance carried out pursuant to the “constitutional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to pro-
tect the Nation against actual or potential attack . . . [and] to 
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the 
security of the United States”91 expressed an intention to allow 
unmonitored electronic surveillance for national security pur-
poses.92 According to the Court, the disclaimer conferred no 
new authority and simply left presidential powers untouched.93 
The Court found authority in the oath clause94 for the 
power “to protect our Government against those who would 
subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means.”95 However, the 
Court determined that the President must exercise the Article 
II authority consistently with the Bill of Rights.96 Although the 
Attorney General had personally approved the wiretaps and 
claimed that he had exercised the President’s powers to protect 
the nation against the threat that domestic organizations 
would attack the government,97 the Court held that domestic 
national security wiretaps required a warrant issued by a neu-
tral magistrate.98 The Court relied on the “broader spirit” of the 
Fourth Amendment and found that the “convergence of First 
and Fourth Amendment values” justified special wariness 
when the government undertakes national security wiretap-
ping.99 In arriving at its holding, the Court balanced “the duty 
of Government to protect the domestic security, [against] the 
 
 88. Id. at 300. 
 89. § 802, 82 Stat. at 214; Keith, 407 U.S. at 302–03. 
 90. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303. 
 91. § 802, 82 Stat. at 214. The Keith Court interpreted the provision as 
having “left presidential powers where it found them.” 407 U.S. at 303. 
 92. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303. 
 93. Id. at 308. 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 95. Keith, 407 U.S. at 310. 
 96. Id. at 312–13. 
 97. Id. at 300–01. 
 98. Id. at 323–24. 
 99. Id. at 313. 
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potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to indi-
vidual privacy and free expression.”100 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Powell concluded that waiving the Fourth Amendment 
probable cause requirement and allowing “unreviewed execu-
tive discretion” to be practiced could cause the executive to 
“yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence 
and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected 
speech.”101 
Although the government cited the unique characteristics 
of ongoing national security surveillance and its fear that leaks 
could undermine the sources and methods of intelligence collec-
tion, the Court refused to recognize an exception to Katz for na-
tional security surveillance.102 The Court took note of the po-
tential for abuse of warrantless surveillance, and it noted that 
courts had the capacity to manage sensitive information and 
could protect intelligence sources and methods through ex 
parte proceedings.103 At the same time, Justice Powell empha-
sized that the case involved domestic targets of surveillance 
and that the Court expressed no opinion on the executive dis-
cretion to conduct such surveillance when foreign powers or 
their agents are targeted.104 In addition, the Court expressly 
reserved the question whether similar rules should govern for-
eign intelligence surveillance and, after noting the “different 
policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of ‘or-
dinary crime’”105 in investigating national security, the Court 
supplied a back-handed invitation for Congress to legislate a 
set of rules for what remained an uncertain terrain—national 
security investigations—for domestic and foreign intelligence.106 
Meanwhile, after Keith, two courts of appeals upheld the 
constitutional authorities of the executive branch to conduct 
warrantless electronic surveillance in pursuit of foreign intelli-
gence.107 However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbiaalso decided a high-profile case at the edges of the post-
Watergate prosecution of the White House-ordered break-in of 
 
 100. Id. at 314–15. 
 101. Id. at 317. 
 102. Id. at 320–21. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 321–22. 
 105. Id. at 322. 
 106. Id. at 322–23. 
 107. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc); 
United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426–27 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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the Democratic Party headquarters. In United States v. Ehr-
lichman,108 “Ehrlichman, the former Chief of Staff to President 
Nixon, argued that the activity he had authorized was a na-
tional security, counterintelligence operation, and therefore not 
illegal.”109 Although the court held that Ehrlichman could not 
rely on such a defense because he “could not show presidential 
authorization . . . two of the three judges wrote a separate con-
currence [to say that] no intelligence or counterintelligence ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment existed.”110 
FISA was the product of a set of compromises unique to 
their time. The executive branch wanted a continuing discre-
tion to employ wiretapping for foreign intelligence unfettered 
by judicial or congressional oversight.111 Because Keith was a 
domestic security case, the door was not shut.112 In addition, 
because Keith acknowledged a possibility that the rules might 
be different for foreign intelligence and the 1968 Crime Control 
Act disclaimed prescribing any rule for foreign intelligence 
gathering, it remained plausible to argue that the executive 
might make its own rules for collecting foreign intelligence.113 
The executive branch’s position was weakened considerably, 
however, by the effects of the Watergate scandal, lawsuits chal-
lenging warrantless surveillance, and the practical problem 
that telephone companies and government agencies were un-
willing to approve electronic surveillance without a court or-
der.114 There were, in addition, high profile investigations of il-
legal spying by intelligence agencies, including by the Senate 
Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Re-
spect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee).115 The 
Church Committee reviewed nearly forty years of domestic 
 
 108. 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 109. Diane Carraway Piette & Jessely Radack, Piercing the “Historical 
Mists”: The People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of 
the “Wall,” 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 437, 448 (2006). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 75. 
 112. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972). 
 113. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 50–52. 
 114. Piette & Radack, supra note 109, at 448; see also S.2726 to Amend the 
National Security Act of 1947 to Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures: 
Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence of the United States S., 101st 
Cong. 136 (1990) (testimony of Mary Lawton, Counsel, Office of Intelligence 
Policy and Review, U.S. Department of Justice) (“Electronic surveillance can 
only be done with phone company cooperation . . . .”). 
 115. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted) (describing the investiga-
tive committees that reviewed intelligence activities). 
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surveillance, learning that every President since Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had asserted and used the authority to authorize 
warrantless electronic surveillance and finding that “[t]oo 
many people have been spied upon by too many Government 
agencies and . . . . Government has often undertaken the secret 
surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, 
even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal 
acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power.”116 The Church Com-
mittee recommended a strict and careful separation of domestic 
and foreign intelligence gathering, although it recommended 
continued surveillance of “hostile foreign intelligence activ-
ity.”117 The committee summarized the effects of these intelli-
gence abuses in a 1976 report: 
FBI headquarters alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intelli-
gence files, and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI 
Field Offices. The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence 
files in 1972 alone. In fact, substantially more individuals and groups 
are subject to intelligence scrutiny than the number of files would ap-
pear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file con-
tains information on more than one individual or group, and this in-
formation is readily retrievable through the FBI General Name 
Index. 
  The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the do-
mestic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statis-
tics: 
• Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened 
and photographed in the United States by the CIA between 
1953–1973, producing a CIA computerized index of nearly 
one and one-half million names. 
• At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photo-
graphed by the FBI between 1940–1966 in eight U.S. cities. 
• Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer 
system and separate files were created on approximately 
7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the 
course of CIA’s Operation CHAOS (1967–1973). 
• Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the 
United States were obtained by the National Security 
Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with 
three United States telegraph companies. 
• An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United 
States Army intelligence files created between the mid-
1960’s and 1971. 
 
 116. 2 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, 
at 5 (1976). 
 117. Id. 
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• Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and 
groups were created by the Internal Revenue Service be-
tween 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were started on 
the basis of political rather than tax criteria. 
• At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on 
an FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a “na-
tional emergency.”118  
The Committee elaborated: 
Since the 1930’s, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped 
and bugged American citizens without the benefit of a judicial war-
rant. . . . The application of vague and elastic standards for wiretap-
ping and bugging has resulted in electronic surveillances which, by 
any objective measure, were improper and seriously infringed the 
Fourth Amendment Rights of both the targets and those with whom 
the targets communicated. The inherently intrusive nature of elec-
tronic surveillance, moreover, has enabled the Government to gener-
ate vast amounts of information—unrelated to any legitimate gov-
ernment interest—about the personal and political lives of American 
citizens. . . . Also formidable . . . is the ‘chilling effect’ which war-
rantless electronic surveillance may have on the constitutional rights 
of those who were not targets of the surveillance, but who perceived 
themselves, whether reasonably or unreasonably, as potential tar-
gets.119  
Watergate, the Church Committee and other investigative 
reports emboldened Congress to control executive overreaching 
in its use of surveillance. According to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, the bill that became FISA was “designed . . . to 
curb the practice by which the Executive Branch may conduct 
warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral de-
termination that national security justifies it,” but to authorize 
the use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.120 Civil liberties groups, such as the ACLU, wor-
ried that if Congress set a wiretap standard too low, it could 
end up “authorizing rather than curtailing intelligence agency 
abuses.”121 In other words, would no legislation be better for 
 
 118. Id. at 6–7. 
 119. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 8 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3904, 3909. 
 120. Id. at 8–9. 
 121. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearing on H.R. 
5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 92 (1978) (statement of 
John H.F. Shattuck, Executive Director, ACLU, Wash. Office), available at 
http://www.cnss.org/fisa011078.pdf [hereinafter FISA Hearing]; see also 
Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background 
and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 793, 808–11 (1989) (discussing the compromises made between 
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civil liberties than bad legislation? At the same time, Congress 
recognized that “no persons should be targeted for electronic 
surveillance unless the Government has evidence they are en-
gaging in criminal conduct which directly threatens national 
security,”122 even though evidence of national security crimes 
could be collected during the electronic surveillance. While this 
suspicion of criminal activity was an essential part of what 
would become the FISA provisions that apply to United States 
citizens, Congress did not intend for FISA to authorize surveil-
lance for the purpose of enforcing the criminal laws.123 Con-
gress understood that intelligence gathering and law enforce-
ment would overlap, and that congressional oversight could 
monitor the uses of FISA-ordered evidence in criminal prosecu-
tions.124 
After six years of hearings and discussion and through the 
stewardship of Attorneys General Edward Levi and Griffin 
Bell, Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, and several 
members of the House and Senate, FISA became law in 
1978.125 In his signing statement, President Carter said: 
The bill requires, for the first time, a prior judicial warrant for all 
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
purposes in the United States in which communications of U.S. per-
sons might be intercepted. It clarifies the Executive’s authority to 
gather foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in the United 
States. It will remove any doubt about the legality of those surveil-
lances which are conducted to protect our country against espionage 
and international terrorism. It will assure FBI field agents and others 
involved in intelligence collection that their acts are authorized by 
statute and, if a U.S. person’s communications are concerned, by a 
court order. And it will protect the privacy of the American people.  
  In short, the act helps to solidify the relationship of trust between 
the American people and their Government. It provides a basis for the 
trust of the American people in the fact that the activities of their in-
telligence agencies are both effective and lawful. It provides enough 
secrecy to ensure that intelligence relating to national security can be 
securely acquired, while permitting review by the courts and Con-
gress to safeguard the rights of Americans and others.126 
 
proponents and opponents of national security electronic surveillance legisla-
tion). 
 122. FISA Hearing, supra note 121, at 92. 
 123. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1160. 
 124. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, S. REP. 
NO. 98-660, at 14 (1984). 
 125. Id. at 1. 
 126. JIMMY CARTER, STATEMENT ON SIGNING S. 1566 INTO LAW 1853–54 
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FISA’s authorization of electronic surveillance of “foreign 
powers” and their agents, terms taken from the Supreme Court 
in Keith reflects the Act’s focus on foreign intelligence.127 From 
the beginning, the definition of “foreign power” has included “a 
group engaged in international terrorism or activities in prepa-
ration therefor.”128 An “agent of a foreign power” included a 
person who “knowingly engages in sabotage or international 
terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or 
on behalf of a foreign power.”129 The term “foreign intelligence 
information” was defined as: 
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States per-
son is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect 
against— 
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a for-
eign power or an agent of a foreign power;  
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; or  
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or  
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory 
that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary 
to— 
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or  
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.130 
Non-United States persons (someone not a citizen or per-
manent resident, among others) could be an “agent of a foreign 
power” by being an officer or employee of a foreign power, or a 
member of an international terrorist organization.131 The gov-
ernment could target United States persons as agents only if 
they knowingly engaged in certain activities, including interna-
tional terrorism which “involve or may involve a violation of the 
criminal statutes of the United States.”132 
The FISA process authorizes “electronic surveillance,” 
which is broadly defined and must fall within one of four cate-
gories: 
  (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveil-
 
(1978), http://www.cnss.org/Carter.pdf. 
 127. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308, 321–22 
(1972). 
 128. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2000). 
 129. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(C). 
 130. Id. § 1801(e). 
 131. Id. § 1801(b)(1)(A). 
 132. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A). 
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lance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent 
by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States 
person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by in-
tentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances 
in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a war-
rant would be required for law enforcement purposes; 
  (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveil-
lance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a 
person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, 
if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include 
the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that 
would be permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of title 18; 
  (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or 
other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, 
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement pur-
poses, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located 
within the United States; or 
  (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire in-
formation, other than from a wire or radio communication, under cir-
cumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.133 
The definition excludes electronic surveillance of communi-
cations taking place entirely abroad, but it reaches wire or ra-
dio communications sent by or intended to be received by a tar-
geted United States person, and those to or from any person 
within the United States without the consent of one party, 
where the interception occurs inside the United States.134 In 
the event of a question concerning whether FISA applies to a 
particular form or use of electronic surveillance, the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee stated in 1977 that “this statute, not any 
claimed presidential power, controls.”135 
In return for subjecting the executive branch to regulation 
of its electronic surveillance activities, FISA does not provide 
the traditional protections against government abuse of its 
electronic surveillance in enforcing the criminal laws.136 FISA 
 
 133. Id. § 1801(f ). 
 134. Id. § 1801(f )(1)–(2). 
 135. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 64 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3904, 3965. The House Conference Report noted that the “exclusive” provision 
“does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court.” H.R. REP. NO. 
95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 
4064. 
 136. For example, targets of law enforcement surveillance must be given 
notice of the surveillance within ninety days of its termination. Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 
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put in place a much more government-friendly process. Instead 
of a neutral magistrate finding probable cause to believe that a 
particular crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed 
and then issuing a warrant that is later noticed to the target,137 
FISA authorizes a special court, the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court (FISC), that meets in secret, ex parte.138 To 
permit electronic surveillance without the target ever learning 
that she was a target, based on a showing that pursuit of for-
eign intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance, 
and that there is probable cause to believe that the target is a 
foreign power or agent of a foreign power.139 
The target may eventually learn of the FISA targeting only 
if the FISA surveillance is used by the government in a crimi-
nal or other proceeding against him before its use against the 
target.140 Only the judge reviewing the lawfulness of the sur-
veillance sees the surveillance logs, in camera.141 Applications 
to the FISC must pass through layers of review inside the Jus-
tice Department and obtain the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral.142 The order must describe in some detail the targets of 
 
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)). Criminal defen-
dants routinely obtain access to the application for surveillance, supporting 
affidavits, surveillance logs, and statements from informants. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(9). 
 137. 18 U.S.C. § 2518. 
 138. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000). 
 139. The FISC grew from seven to eleven judges with enactment of the Pa-
triot Act. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)). If the government does not pre-
vail before the FISC, it may appeal to a three-judge FISA Court of Review. 50 
U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000). 
 140. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(3), 1806(f )–(g) (2000). FISC does not publish its 
decisions, its orders are sealed, proceedings are ex parte. See id. § 1806(f ). 
 141. Id. § 1806(f ). A reviewing court reviews the materials ex parte and in 
camera and only discloses them to the defendant “where disclosure is neces-
sary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.” Id. 
If the Attorney General files a claim of privilege in a pending proceeding 
against the target of FISA surveillance, the targets of surveillance may not be 
able to examine materials related to the surveillance. Id. A district court may 
review FISC-ordered surveillance and may overturn a nondisclosure decision 
if the certifications of compliance with FISA requirements are clearly errone-
ous. Id. No court has ordered disclosure. Id.; see also, e.g., ACLU Found. of S. 
Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 469–71 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining why district 
courts rarely overturn nondisclosure decisions). 
 142. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2); see also Piette & Radack, supra note 109, at 
460 (“‘[T]he FBI played a much stronger role in reviewing and drafting cases’ 
and . . . ‘there were some 25 layers of review at the Bureau before the Director 
signed off on [an] application and it came back to our office for AG approval 
. . . .’”) (quoting a former Justice department lawyer). 
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the surveillance and the places where surveillance will occur.143 
Time limits are set for the surveillance, although there are op-
portunities to extend the time.144 Also, once the statutory find-
ings are made by the FISC, the judge “shall” issue the surveil-
lance order.145 
To reduce the chance that FISA surveillance could inter-
fere with the rights of U.S. persons, FISA requires “minimiza-
tion procedures” that the Attorney General must adopt in order 
to curtail acquisition and retention and prohibit dissemination 
of nonpublic information about U.S. persons.146 In essence, 
FISA forbids disclosing information obtained from FISA sur-
veillance except as provided in the minimization procedures,147 
although “information that is evidence of a crime which has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed can be retained or 
disseminated for law enforcement purposes.”148 
To underscore that Congress intended this new scheme to 
replace entirely the previously unregulated electronic surveil-
lance practices of the executive branch, federal law includes a 
provision stating that its procedures, along with those prescrib-
ing rules for law enforcement surveillance, provide the “exclu-
sive means” of engaging in electronic surveillance.149 The provi-
sion also clarified that the exclusivity provision does not cover 
other foreign electronic surveillance conducted abroad, includ-
ing any such surveillance that targets U.S. persons.150 Another 
FISA provision makes it a crime to conduct electronic surveil-
lance “except as authorized by statute.”151 
FISA also includes authorization for surveillance outside 
the FISA process for up to one year when directed solely at 
“communications transmitted by means of communications 
used exclusively between or among foreign powers” and there is 
“no substantial likelihood” that communication involving a U.S. 
person will be acquired.152 However, this is a narrow exception 
 
 143. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(c)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 1A 2006). 
 144. Id. § 1805(e). 
 145. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000). 
 146. Id. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1805(a)(4). 
 147. Id. § 1806(a). 
 148. Id. § 1801(h)(3). Problems of minimization and prosecution are consid-
ered infra  notes 515–50 and accompanying text. 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). 
 150. Id. 
 151. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000). 
 152. Id. § 1802(a)(1). The effects of new technology on FISA are addressed 
infra Part IV.A. 
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to the default FISA processes. Because this exception for pro-
grammatic surveillance is allowed only for direct foreign gov-
ernment communications, it does not allow surveillance outside 
the FISA process when foreign powers use public communica-
tions networks. Congress built into law two other exceptions to 
the exclusivity of the FISA process gathering for foreign intelli-
gence. One section permits surveillance outside FISA for up to 
fifteen days following a declaration of war,153 and the other 
permits the Attorney General to certify that “an emergency 
situation exists” that requires electronic surveillance before an 
order from the FISC could be obtained.154 The emergency au-
thority may be exercised for up to seventy-two hours from the 
time authorization is made by the Attorney General, until the 
information sought is obtained, or until the FISC denies the 
application for surveillance, whichever is earlier.155 The emer-
gency procedures still demand an application to a judge, but it 
is not required until seventy-two hours after the emergency au-
thorization.156 
Although the scheme was complex, the compromise struck 
a fundamental balance. Those most worried about the abuses of 
past presidents and their subordinates took comfort in the 
regulation of foreign intelligence surveillance that involved Ar-
ticle III judges, albeit to a limited extent. The secrecy, ex parte 
proceedings, and corresponding lack of notice to the targets was 
troubling, but at least the procedures were prescribed by law. 
From the executive branch and intelligence investigators’ per-
spectives, what was done in the past on the basis of supposed 
inherent constitutional authority was now subject to rules im-
posed by Congress, but once learned and followed, the rules 
lent legitimacy to secret surveillance. 
II.  THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 
PRACTICE UP TO SEPTEMBER 11   
Between 1978 and the early 1990’s, FISA operated to the 
satisfaction of the principally involved institutions, and it 
changed only incrementally. FISA applications grew in number 
during this period, although the growth was modest until 1995 
(following the first World Trade Center and Oklahoma City 
 
 153. 50 U.S.C. § 1811. 
 154. Id. § 1805(f )(1). 
 155. Id. § 1805(f ). 
 156. Id.  
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bombings), when the number of annual orders doubled from the 
early years, to about one thousand by 2001.157 The executive 
branch could hardly complain—it always, or nearly always, got 
what it wanted when it made an application to the FISC.158 In-
side the Justice Department, the FBI was required to change 
the way it had always operated, and it did so primarily through 
the promulgation and implementation of sets of guidelines, first 
issued by Attorney General Edward Levi in 1976.159 The FBI 
guidelines, revised by successive administrations, followed the 
FISA strictures and supplied more detail for investigations, in-
cluding those outside the triggering language of FISA.160 
Meanwhile, federal courts upheld FISA against constitutional 
challenges and supported the use of FISA surveillance as evi-
dence in criminal cases after finding that the “primary pur-
pose” of the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence.161 
In addition, the Justice Department created a central 
gatekeeper for all FISA applications, the Office of Intelligence 
Policy and Review (OIPR). OIPR was assigned to represent the 
United States before the FISC and to ensure institutional re-
sponsibility for FISA compliance,162 allowing FISA expertise to 
 
 157. Until expanded reporting requirements were required beginning in 
2005, brief annual reports of FISA activity were provided by the Attorney 
General, including the volume of applications approved for the year. See For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa (fol-
low “FISA Annual Reports to Congress” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
The reports show an average of five hundred to six hundred requests in the 
1980s and early 1990s before an increase after 1995. See id. The more recent 
reporting requirements are addressed infra 325–327. 
 158. After more than twenty years, only two FISA applications had been 
rejected. In 1981, the FISC ruled that it had no jurisdiction to approve an ap-
plication for a physical search for national security purposes. In re the Applica-
tion of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential 
Premises and Personal Property (F.I.S.C. 1981), as reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-
280, at 16–19 (1981). In 1997, an application for electronic surveillance was 
rejected “with leave to amend,” but the government did not pursue the matter. 
Supreme Court Rebuffs FISA Challenge, SECRECY NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2001/04/042301.html. 
 159. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SEC. AND TERRORISM OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th CONG., THE DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGA-
TION GUIDELINES 51–64 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter DOMESTIC SECURITY 
GUIDELINES]. For a review of these and subsequent versions of the guidelines, 
see STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 617–27 (4th ed. 2007). 
 160. See DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDELINES, supra note 159. 
 161. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff ’d, 189 
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 162. See Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
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develop inside the Department. Their office sought to make 
FISA applications detailed and complete.163 When OIPR deliv-
ered applications to the FISC, the Department could represent 
that it sought electronic surveillance in pursuit of a “foreign in-
telligence” purpose, not to spy on political enemies or to end-
run the magistrate in building a criminal case.164 
As the federal courts admitted FISA-obtained evidence in 
criminal prosecutions after finding that the primary purpose of 
the investigation was to collect foreign intelligence, OIPR per-
formed its gatekeeping role to assure that the Department of 
Justice followed FISA procedures. Under OIPR head Mary 
Lawton, who ran OIPR from 1982 until her sudden death in 
1993, OIPR operated without written guidelines.165 Although 
Lawton believed that some things were better “left undefined,” 
she and OIPR made sure that the intelligence and law en-
forcement personnel regularly consulted one another.166 The 
9/11 Commission Report and an Inspector General’s report on 
the FBI and intelligence related to the September 11 attacks 
concluded that, from the inception of FISA through the early 
1990’s, “prosecutors had informal arrangements for obtaining 
information gathered in the FISA process,”167 and that “prose-
cutors within the Department’s Criminal Division . . . had to be 
consulted in connection with intelligence investigations in 
which federal criminal activity was uncovered, or when legal 
advice was needed to avoid investigative steps that might inad-
vertently jeopardize the option of prosecution using information 
obtained from the intelligence investigation.”168 
Gradually, the insistence of OIPR and the FISC on fulsome 
FISA applications resulted in more elaborate procedures, in-
cluding those that separated law enforcement and intelligence 
agents and activities.169 Although implementation of the FISA 
purpose requirement was to some extent responsible for devel-
 
agency/doj/oipr/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
 163. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 535 (2006). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Piette & Radack, supra note 109, at 449–52. 
 166. Id. at 451–52. 
 167. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 78 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 168. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF 
THE FBI’S HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SEP-
TEMBER 11 ATTACKS 24 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 OIG REPORT]. 
 169. Id. at 25–27. 
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oping what evolved into a “wall,” to a large degree the barriers 
between successful intelligence and law enforcement coopera-
tion and sharing were due to a perennially cumbersome FBI 
bureaucracy, an equally bad FBI computer system, and a cul-
ture inside the Criminal Division and intelligence sides of the 
FBI that simply nurtured separation.170 
For several years, the OIPR role in managing the FISA 
process evolved without major incidents.171 However, during 
the Aldrich Ames espionage prosecution in 1994, back-channel 
cooperation between the CIA and FBI prompted OIPR to advise 
the Attorney General that the close CIA/FBI collaboration in 
the Ames investigation could provide Ames’ lawyers with an 
argument that the FISA warrants were misused.172 Ames ac-
cepted a plea bargain, so no test of the OIPR concern was pre-
sented to a judge.173 Still, the Justice Department was put on 
notice that back-channel consultations between its intelligence 
and law enforcement officials could be problematic. 
Inside the Justice Department, Deputy Attorney General 
Jamie Gorelick convened a working group to reconcile emerging 
differences of opinion between OIPR, the Criminal Division, 
and FBI over “wall” issues.174 The working group sought an 
opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) on the question 
of whether the FISC could approve a search under FISA only 
when the collection of foreign intelligence was the “primary 
purpose” of the search, or whether it sufficed that such collec-
tion was one of the purposes.175 In February 1995, the OLC 
“concluded that ‘“courts are more likely to adopt the ‘primary 
purpose’ test than any less stringent formulation.”’”176 Based on 
 
 170. Schulhofer, supra note 163, at 535–36 (“FISA’s ‘purpose’ requirement 
was a seed from which increasingly intricate obstacles developed. Yet the re-
sulting problems were not inevitable, even under the law as it stood before 
9/11; most of the difficulties could have been avoided with better training, 
more common sense, and more willingness to tolerate ambiguity and decen-
tralized discretion.”). 
 171. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78. 
 172. Id. 
 173. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 665 (2d ed. 1997). 
 174. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79. 
 175. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL’S REVIEW TEAM ON THE HANDLING OF THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABO-
RATORY INVESTIGATION 720 (May 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ 
readingroom/bellows.htm [hereinafter BELLOWS REPORT]. 
 176. Implementation of the USA PATRIOT ACT: Section 218—Foreign In-
telligence Information (“The Wall”): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
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the FISA case law, OLC determined that “the greater the in-
volvement of prosecutors in the planning and execution of FISA 
searches, the greater is the chance that the government could 
not assert in good faith that the ‘primary purpose’ was the col-
lection of foreign intelligence.”177 OLC thus recommended that 
“an appropriate internal process” should be established “that 
FISA certifications are consistent with the ‘primary purpose’ 
test.”178 
Meanwhile, to assure that misuse of FISA did not occur, 
OIPR began imposing information-sharing controls on its own 
initiative.179 The working group made recommendations to 
Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, who in turn submitted them 
to Attorney General Reno.180 In March 1995,181 Gorelick wrote 
a memorandum prescribing special “wall” procedures for two 
pending cases, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
prosecution.182 The memorandum instructed that the intelli-
gence investigation in the New York case would go forward 
“without any direction or control”183 by the U.S. Attorney’s of-
fice or the Criminal Division, and it required FBI headquarters 
or OIPR approval to share some portions of intelligence inves-
tigative memoranda with law enforcement agents.184 In addi-
tion to these “wall” procedures, the March memorandum also 
encouraged cooperation and coordination between the intelli-
gence and law enforcement personnel in a few particular 
ways.185 According to a 2004 Office of the Inspector General re-
port, the March memorandum from Gorelick was somehow 
misconstrued and its “wall” procedures were applied through-
 
Cong. 17–34 (2005) (statement of David S. Kris, Senior Vice President, Time 
Warner Inc.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/kris042805 
.pdf. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78. 
 180. Id. at 79. 
 181. See id. at 539 n.83 (stating that Jamie Gorelick authored the memo to 
Mary Jo White in March, 1995). 
 182. See Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney Gen., to 
Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., et al. 1–4 (Mar. 1995) [herein-
after Gorelick Memo] (regarding “Instructions on Separation of Certain Coun-
terintelligence and Criminal Investigations”), available at http://www.usdoj 
.gov/ag/testimony/2004/1995_gorelick_memo.pdf. 
 183. Id. at 3. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 2–3. 
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out the FBI for all FISA applications by 1997.186 Notably, the 
restrictive procedures in the Gorelick memorandum exceeded 
any requirements imposed by FISA or case law.187 
Then, in July 1995, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a 
set of secret internal guidelines to prescribe procedures for con-
tacts among the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, the 
FBI, and OIPR.188 Contacts between the prosecutors and their 
investigators and intelligence officials were limited, logged, and 
noted to the OIPR.189 These entities could exchange 
consultations and advice, but the contacts should “not inadver-
tently result in either the fact or the appearance of the Crimi-
nal Division’s directing or controlling” an investigation.190 The 
guidelines were not written to affect contacts and information-
sharing between investigating agents—internal to the Criminal 
Division or between criminal and intelligence investigators—
but instead were intended to apply only between investigators 
and prosecutors.191 
According to a later Office of the Inspector General Report, 
the OIPR lawyers almost immediately misconstrued and mis-
applied the 1995 guidelines as containing the special proce-
dures imposed in New York by the March Gorelick memoran-
dum, thus interpreting FISA as essentially prohibiting contact 
between the law enforcement and intelligence sides of an inves-
tigation.192 Coordination between law enforcement and intelli-
gence officials that had occurred before 1995 fell off after issu-
ance of the guidelines, and such contacts that did occur came so 
 
 186. See 2004 OIG REPORT, supra note 168, at 31. 
 187. See Gorelick Memo, supra note 182, at 2 (explaining that the recom-
mended procedures “go beyond what is legally required”). 
 188. See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., to Assistant At-
torney Gen., Criminal Div., et al. (July 19, 1995) (regarding “Procedures for 
Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign In-
telligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations”), available at http:// 
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id. pt. A.6. 
 191. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79; see also LAWRENCE 
WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11, at 343 
(2006) (“The Justice Department promulgated a new policy in 1995 designed 
to regulate the exchange of information between agents and criminal prosecu-
tors, but not among the agents themselves.”). 
 192. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79 (“[The] procedures 
were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied.”); 2004 OIG REPORT, 
supra note 168, at 33; WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 343 (“Bureaucratic confu-
sion and inertia allowed the policy to gradually choke off the flow of essential 
information . . . .”). 
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late in the process as to be practically useless.193 Although not 
required by FISA, a metaphorical “wall” between law enforce-
ment and intelligence gathering was thus put in place when-
ever an intelligence investigation suggested some indication of 
criminal activity.194 The FBI then developed a parallel system 
of “dirty” teams for gathering intelligence and “clean” teams for 
criminal law enforcement.195 The teams could investigate the 
same target at the same time, but they rarely talked with one 
another.196 
OIPR maintained its gatekeeper role throughout this pe-
riod—only through it would information pass to the Criminal 
Division. According to the 9/11 Commission, OIPR sustained its 
position in part by maintaining it reflected the concerns of the 
chief judge of the FISC, and that “if it could not regulate the 
flow of information to criminal prosecutors, it would no longer 
present the FBI’s warrant requests to the FISA Court.”197 Al-
though the OIPR FISA procedures were revised between 1995 
and 2002 to permit consultation between the intelligence and 
prosecution sides of the FBI “aimed at preserving the option of 
criminal prosecution,” the Criminal Division was not allowed to 
“direct or control the FISA investigation.”198 During this period, 
the FISC approved the OIPR procedures and issued case-
specific information screening walls.199 These mechanisms var-
ied with the complexity of the investigation, and sometimes 
saw the FISC serving as the “wall” between the two sides.200 In 
1999, a badly managed espionage investigation of Los Alamos 
 
 193. See Hearing, supra note 15, at 49. 
 194. See WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 343 (characterizing the FISC as the 
“arbiter of what information could be shared—‘thrown over the Wall’”). 
 195. Roberto Suro, FBI’s “Clean” Team Follows “Dirty” Work of Intelligence, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1999, at A13. 
 196. Id.; see also Hearing, supra note 15, at 49–50 (describing the guide-
lines as leading to decreased coordination on intelligence cases); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: COORDINATION 
WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS IS LIMITED 4 
(2001) (“[The] implementation and interpretation of the procedures . . . led to a 
significant decline in coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Divi-
sion.”). 
 197. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79. 
 198. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 729; In re All Matters Submitted to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (FISA 
Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717. 
 199. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 539 n.83. 
 200. See id. 
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National Laboratory scientist Wen Ho Lee201 led the Attorney 
General to appoint a commission to review the Lee investiga-
tion, including the apparent failure to take advantage of FISA 
procedures.202 The investigation found that the FBI should 
have sought and obtained FISA surveillance of Lee, and that 
OIPR insisted that the Justice Department have more evidence 
of foreign agency than FISA requires.203 
III.  THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 CHANGES   
The euphemism that “everything changed”204 after the 
September 11 attacks probably exaggerates less what hap-
pened to FISA than to most other pre-attack authorities in the 
counter-terrorism area. Critics of the Patriot Act who do not 
know its lineage often complain that the massive bill and its 
many controversial amendments to FISA and to other laws was 
rushed through Congress by the Bush administration and that 
members only hastily and cursorily reviewed the bill in the 
seven weeks between its introduction and enactment.205 Al-
though the rush to judgment in Congress was real, the Justice 
Department had drafts of portions of what would become the 
Patriot Act prepared and waiting before the September 11 at-
tacks—the hijackers provided the political atmosphere needed 
to provide favorable consideration of some significant changes 
in the law.206 Still, no committee reports accompanied the Pa-
 
 201. See Bob Drogin, How FBI’s Flawed Case Against Lee Unraveled, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2000, at 1. 
 202. See BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 175, at 14–15. 
 203. See id. at 482–83, 497. 
 204. See, e.g., Editorial, “The Day That Everything Changed,” L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 2001, at 8 (stating that September 11 was “the day that everything 
changed in our country”). 
 205. See Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2004); id. at 1151–52 (noting “the 
dangers inherent in the haste to legislate” and that on September 17, 2001, 
Attorney General Ashcroft called for Congress to pass the administration’s un-
seen and not completely drafted bill that week); see also Clayton Northouse, 
Interview with U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, April 21, 2004, in PROTECTING 
WHAT MATTERS: TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11 72, 72–80 
(Clayton Northouse ed., 2006) (interviewing Sen. Russ Feingold, the only sena-
tor to vote against the Patriot Act). 
 206. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE 
WAR ON TERROR 71 (2006) (stating that career lawyers at the Justice Depart-
ment developed a “wish list” of proposals for the Patriot Act from provisions 
not passed when Congress enacted antiterrorism legislation in 1996). 
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triot Act describing and explaining any fundamental rethinking 
of the basic terms of the FISA compromise of interests.207 
Two developments merit special attention because, taken 
together, they portend the death of FISA—one section of the 
Patriot Act208 with its implementation by the FISA Court of 
Review and the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). 
A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSE 
RULE 
Until amended by the Patriot Act, FISA required that an 
application to the FISC for electronic surveillance had to in-
clude a certification that “the purpose of the surveillance is to 
obtain foreign intelligence information.”209 As interpreted by 
the federal courts between FISA’s implementation and 2001, in 
practice the rule was that the “primary purpose” of the FISA 
surveillance must be to obtain foreign intelligence.210 If and 
when a law enforcement purpose became dominant in an inves-
tigation, FISA required that traditional criminal investigative 
rules be followed in order to continue the surveillance.211 
In enacting FISA, Congress understood that, in many 
situations, intelligence and law enforcement investigators work 
side-by-side and that information collected in intelligence gath-
ering becomes evidence in an eventual criminal proceeding.212 
In the aggregate, however, foreign intelligence gathering is 
programmatic, rather than targeting specific individuals for 
known or anticipated crimes.213 Intelligence investigations of-
ten continue long after a completed criminal act has been 
prosecuted.214 In addition, the product of foreign intelligence 
investigations may, at any point in time, appear fragmented 
 
 207. See Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil 
Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 227 (2003) (stating that no committee re-
ports accompanied the Patriot Act). 
 208. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 
2001 § 218 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B)). 
 209. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000) (current version at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. I 2003)). 
 210. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1159. 
 211. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 
1980). 
 212. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 4. 
 213. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1152. 
 214. Id. 
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and hard to evaluate to someone in law enforcement.215 The 
culture of criminal investigations, including the legal standards 
of particularity, criminality, and eventual notice to the target, 
has no parallel in the world of foreign intelligence gathering.216 
The intelligence gathering and law enforcement spheres 
overlapped in 1978, and they overlap to a greater extent now.217 
Intelligence investigations turn up leads that provide the 
criminal investigators what they need to make a case.218 The 
criminal enforcement team may gain intelligence during the 
course of their surveillance or in an interrogation.219 However, 
as counter-terrorism officials recognized the value of collabora-
tion between intelligence and law enforcement investigators, 
they also confronted formidable institutional—not legal—
resistance.220 The tension between the need for secrecy and the 
demand to share information is inevitable, long-standing, and 
entrenched.221 From the intelligence side, leaks are anathema, 
and compromised sources have no value.222 Criminal investiga-
tors and prosecutors work assiduously to avoid tainting prose-
cution evidence through contact with intelligence officials 
whose knowledge could render critical evidence inadmissible.223 
The law requires the use of law enforcement investigative pro-
cedures if the sole purpose of surveillance is prosecution, and it 
permits FISA procedures if the purpose of the investigation is 
the collection of foreign intelligence.224 To some extent, the 
“wall” procedures grew out of concern for preserving these base-
line rules.225 By and large, however, the separate institutional 
responsibilities and concerns are reflected in the separate divi-
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See infra notes 291–95 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 4. 
 219. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 424. 
 220. See id. at 79 (describing the barriers to information-sharing as the 
“wall”). 
 221. See MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 
18 (3d ed. 2006). 
 222. See Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement 
and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 331, 337–38 (1998). 
 223. See id.; WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 205 (“[FBI personnel] tended to be 
close-mouthed and unhelpful, treating all intelligence as potential evidence 
that couldn’t be compromised, whether there was an actual criminal case or 
not.”). 
 224. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78. 
 225. See id. at 79 (describing the “wall” as an accumulation of “institutional 
beliefs and practices”). 
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sions for criminal and national security investigations inside 
the FBI, and they show that the “wall” is much more grounded 
in cultural or institutional matters than it is in legal con-
cerns.226 The institutional differences, rivalries, and bureaucra-
cies transcend the FBI and include the CIA and NSA, before 
and after September 11.227 
When the failures in information-sharing and cooperation 
surrounding the September 11 hijackers came to light,228 the 
Bush administration determined to lower the supposed barriers 
and turn loose all the investigative resources available in a 
paradigm of prevention229 to complement prosecution and other 
means of combating terrorism. Initially, the Justice Depart-
ment proposed an amendment that would have replaced FISA’s 
certification requirement that “the purpose” of surveillance was 
to obtain foreign intelligence with “‘a’ purpose.”230 According to 
the Department, the change “would eliminate the current need 
continually to evaluate the relative weight of criminal and in-
telligence purposes, and would facilitate information sharing 
between law enforcement and foreign intelligence authori-
ties.”231 Even in the short time given to consider the proposal, 
members objected that the “a purpose” standard would open 
the door for virtually unlimited use of FISA in criminal investi-
gations, where foreign intelligence is only remotely connected 
 
 226. See WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 242 (“[T]he two men most responsible 
for putting a stop to bin Laden and al-Qaeda . . . disliked each other intensely  
. . . . From the start, the response of American intelligence to the challenge 
presented by al-Qaeda was hampered by the dismal personal relationships 
and institutional warfare that these men exemplified.”). 
 227. Id. at 283 (stating that after the African embassy bombings, the NSA 
monitored satellite phone calls of senior al Qaeda leaders, but refused to share 
the raw data with the FBI, CIA, or White House counter-terrorism officials); 
id. at 312 (noting that the CIA distrusted the senior FBI official and feared 
that the FBI “was too blundering and indiscriminate to be trusted with sensi-
tive intelligence”); id. at 314–15, 340–42 (noting that the CIA knew the 9/11 
hijackers in the United States but that the CIA did not share that information 
with the FBI); id. at 343 (suggesting that the CIA and NSA restricted 
information-sharing after “eagerly institutionaliz[ing]” the “wall”). 
 228. Two of the suspected 9/11 hijackers had been on a CIA watch list, but 
the CIA informed the FBI only after they entered the United States. Guy Gug-
liotta, Terrorism “Watch List” Was No Match for Hijackers, WASH. POST, Sept. 
23, 2001, at A22. 
 229. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET, supra note 6. 
 230. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, SECTION-BY-
SECTION ANALYSIS (2001), available at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/ 
Terrorism_militias/20010919_doj_ata_analysis.html. 
 231. Id. 
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to the investigation.232 Even a Justice Department FISA expert 
admitted that the proposed amendment to the purpose lan-
guage had less to do with what information could be collected 
than with facilitating coordination between intelligence and 
law enforcement after collection.233 Senator Leahy then pro-
posed a new provision to facilitate information sharing, inde-
pendent of the purpose certification and the administration 
agreed to his proposal.234 The new section was enacted and it 
permits those who acquire foreign intelligence by conducting 
electronic surveillance to “consult with Federal law enforce-
ment officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect 
against” terrorist activities by foreign powers or their agents.235 
During the course of the Congressional debate, members 
and outside experts questioned the constitutionality of the 
change to “a” purpose, from “the” or “primary” purpose.236 Al-
 
 232. Beryl A. Howell, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Has the Solu-
tion Become the Problem?, in PROTECTING WHAT MATTERS: TECHNOLOGY, SE-
CURITY, AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11 118, 124 (Clayton Northouse ed., 2006). 
 233. Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 65 (2001) [hereinafter Protecting 
Constitutional Freedoms] (testimony of David S. Kris, Assoc. Deputy Att’y 
Gen.); see also S. 1448, The Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act of 2001 and 
Other Legislative Proposals in the Wake of the September 11, 2001 Attacks: 
Hearing before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 21 (2001) 
[hereinafter Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act] (testimony of David S. Kris, 
Assoc.iate Deputy Att’y Gen.) (“[T]he administration’s proposal [is] designed to 
foster and facilitate greater coordination between the law enforcement and the 
intelligence sides of the Government.”). 
 234. See Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary 
Comm., and Democratic Manager of the Senate Debate on the Anti-Terrorism 
Bill (Oct. 25, 2001), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/102501.html. 
 235. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 504(a), 115 Stat. 272, 364–65 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1806(k), 1825(k)). The Act states that such coordination “shall not preclude” 
the required FISA certification. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000) 
(requiring certification that “a significant purpose” of the surveillance re-
quested is to obtain foreign intelligence). 
 236. See Protecting Constitutional Freedoms, supra note 233, at 45–46 
(statement of Morton Halperin, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations); 
Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act, supra note 233, at 44–45 (2001) 
(prepared statement of Jeffrey H. Smith, Partner, Arnold & Porter) (arguing 
that the “Committee should be careful in endorsing [the change to ‘a’ purpose] 
because it holds out the potential that the government would seek FISA sur-
veillance warrants—when it didn’t have enough information to get a Title III 
order—but in which the foreign intelligence information to be obtained was 
remote or highly speculative”). But see Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24–25 (2001) [hereinafter Homeland 
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though the administration stated that it would provide a legal 
analysis in support of the proposed change,237 at a Senate Judi-
ciary Committee hearing, Senator Dianne Feinstein urged At-
torney General Ashcroft to consider an alternative formulation 
of the purpose requirement, to “substantial or significant pur-
pose” rather than to “a purpose.”238 The Attorney General 
agreed to support a slight change in the proposal,239 and the 
eventual Patriot Act amended FISA to provide that obtaining 
foreign intelligence must be “a significant purpose” of the sur-
veillance.240 
During the floor debate Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Patrick Leahy acknowledged that “[p]rotection 
against these foreign-based threats by any lawful means is 
within the scope of the definition of ‘foreign intelligence infor-
mation,’ and the use of FISA to gather evidence for the en-
forcement of these laws was contemplated in the enactment of 
FISA.”241 Senator Dianne Feinstein also opined that the objec-
tive of the change in the purpose language in the Patriot Act 
was to make it 
easier to collect foreign intelligence information . . . . 
  . . . [I]n today’s world things are not so simple. In many cases, sur-
veillance will have two key goals—the gathering of foreign intelli-
gence, and the gathering of evidence for a criminal prosecution. . . .  
  Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is 
primary . . . this bill strikes a new balance. It will now require that a 
“significant” purpose of the investigation must be foreign intelligence 
gathering to proceed with surveillance under FISA. 
  The effect of this provision will be to make it easier for law en-
forcement to . . . [use FISA] . . . where the subject of the surveillance 
is both a potential source of valuable intelligence and the potential 
target of a criminal prosecution.242  
These comments were embraced later by the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) as supporting its 
interpretation of the change in the purpose language as to 
 
Defense] (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen.). 
 237. Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act, supra note 233, at 21–22 (testi-
mony of David S. Kris, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
 238. Homeland Defense, supra note 236, at 24–25 (statement of Sen. Di-
anne Feinstein, Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary). 
 239. Id. at 25 (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen.). 
 240. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. at 291. 
 241. 147 Cong. Rec. S10,990, S11,004 (2001). 
 242. Id. at S10,586, S10,591. 
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practically eliminate any requirement that the government 
show a foreign intelligence purpose in its FISA applications.243 
However, the Leahy and Feinstein statements do not fairly re-
flect an intention, on their part or on the part of Congress as a 
whole, to change the overarching requirement of FISA that its 
processes be employed in pursuit of foreign intelligence. Sena-
tor Leahy simply acknowledged that it had been understood 
from the beginning of FISA that information collected under it 
could be used in prosecution, and Senator Feinstein noted that 
the statutory amendment will make it “easier” to use FISA in 
criminal cases, not that the foreign intelligence core of FISA 
was eliminated.244 
The limited attention to this issue during floor debates and 
the lack of committee reports is unfortunate. In the determina-
tion to enact the new measures quickly after September 11, the 
details and complexities of FISA and careful consideration of 
the effects of its amendments were mostly lost on the reform-
ers. From the beginnings of FISA in 1978, however, national 
security crimes provided a fusing point between foreign intelli-
gence collection and law enforcement. The wall between the 
two types of surveillance thus had an open portal of sorts early 
on, and the Patriot Act change in the purpose language eased 
its use. In other words, the adjective “significant” has signifi-
cant meaning in the amended FISA. There was movement of 
the standard, but not to such an extent that “a purpose” to col-
lect foreign intelligence would suffice. 
As part of a bundle of what some viewed as significant and 
controversial changes to existing legislation that the Bush ad-
ministration effectively rushed through Congress, Congress en-
acted the purpose amendment and several others subject to a 
five-year sunset provision.245 After enactment of the Patriot 
Act, the FISC responded to the first FISA applications filed un-
der the revised Act by incorporating the augmented case-by-
case 1995 OIPR procedures as formal minimization procedures 
that would apply to all future applications to the FISC.246 Un-
daunted by the FISC order, the Justice Department immedi-
ately changed its guidelines to suspend the “chaperone” re-
 
 243. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732–33 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 244. See supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text. 
 245. USA Patriot Act § 224, 115 Stat. at 295. 
 246. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729; In re All Matters Submitted to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (FISA Ct. 
Rev. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717. 
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quirement that OIPR be present during any contacts between 
Criminal Division and FBI investigators concerning FISA mat-
ters.247 Instead, OIPR and the FISC would thereafter receive 
briefings about such meetings.248 More concrete changes came 
in March 2002, when new Intelligence Sharing Procedures 
were approved by Attorney General Ashcroft.249 The new guide-
lines removed the information screening procedures and lifted 
the restriction that had been formally in place since 1995 on 
prosecutors or other law enforcement officials “directing or con-
trolling” the use of FISA surveillance.250 In addition, the new 
procedures encouraged complete sharing of information and 
advice and emphasized that “[t]he overriding need to protect 
the national security from foreign threats compels a full and 
free exchange of information and ideas.”251 Prosecutors are ex-
pected to have access to all information developed by the FBI in 
field intelligence investigations undertaken pursuant to FISA 
and prosecutors may advise the FBI about “all issues.”252 Al-
though the Criminal Division, FBI, and OIPR are expected to 
meet and consult, OIPR is not required to be present when the 
other two meet.253 
The new guidelines effectively dismantled the system that 
OIPR had in place since 1995. Although the 1995 procedures 
had erected information barriers that were not required by 
FISA, they assured that FISA was being used for its intended 
purpose and protected against tainting criminal cases with evi-
dence obtained for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence. 
The Ashcroft guidelines are, like their 1995 predecessor, for the 
most part not required by FISA, as amended by the Patriot 
Act.254 The new information sharing provision in the Patriot 
Act did provide a statutory basis to remove barriers that had 
 
 247. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 619. 
 248. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729. 
 249. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 615. 
 250. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 733–34. 
 251. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, 
Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counter-
intelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI to Dir. of the FBI, Assistant 
Att’y Gen. for the Criminal Div., Counsel for Intelligence Policy, and United 
States Attorneys (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html (hereinafter March 2002 procedures). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. 
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existed because of the previous procedures, including elimina-
tion of the OIPR as chaperone.255 Although the legislative his-
tory surrounding the Patriot Act amendment to the purpose 
language does not clearly illuminate its purpose, the apparent 
aim was to facilitate information sharing between intelligence 
and law enforcement personnel after information is collected 
and, to a lesser extent, eliminate the incorrect but widespread 
belief that the use of FISA processes could undermine a subse-
quent or even contemporaneous prosecution.256  
The change in the purpose language was really a change in 
emphasis only; it did not provide the basis for the elimination 
of the “direction or control” restriction on the Criminal Divi-
sion. That single change in the procedures could be read to 
open up just the sort of misuse of FISA that was feared by the 
en banc FISC in its 2002 opinion.257 Prosecutors that did not 
have grounds for a Title III warrant could urge intelligence in-
vestigators to expand their FISA surveillance parameters in 
pursuit of a criminal charge.258 With such surveillance in place, 
FISA orders permit longer periods of surveillance, easier re-
newals, and less oversight than Title III.259 The “direction or 
control” change was not required by the Patriot Act, and it ap-
parently reflected the Attorney General’s determination to 
move vigorously forward with the policy of prevention.  
After the Attorney General approved the March 2002 pro-
cedures, the Department of Justice submitted a new applica-
tion for FISA surveillance and, as part of the application, 
moved that the FISC vacate its minimization and wall proce-
dures to the extent they are inconsistent with the new OIPR 
procedures.260 In May 2002, the FISC issued a decision, joined 
by all seven judges of the court, that agreed with the request 
 
 255. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 504(a), 115 Stat. 272, 364–65 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1806(k), 1825(k)). 
 256. See supra Part III, notes 209–28 and accompanying text. 
 257. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624–25 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), abrogated by In re 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 258. Id. at 624. 
 259. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) (2000) (allowing surveillance for a 
maximum time of ninety days, or one year if surveillance is targeted against a 
foreign power), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000) (allowing surveillance for a 
maximum time of thirty days). 
 260. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
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for the most part, but that rejected a portion of the new Justice 
Department guidelines and ordered new procedures to ensure 
the integrity of the underlying foreign intelligence purpose of 
FISA investigations.261 The FISC opined that the new Justice 
Department procedures “appear to be designed to amend the 
law and substitute the FISA for [criminal law enforcement] 
electronic surveillances.”262 As the FISC interpreted FISA, the 
Justice Department procedures would gut the minimization re-
quirements—designed to minimize the gathering of information 
about United States persons and to prevent its dissemination—
if the Criminal Division could so easily use FISA-obtained elec-
tronic surveillance, and the Patriot Act did not affect those 
minimization requirements.263 Instead of using minimization to 
determine the “need of the United States to obtain, produce, 
and disseminate foreign intelligence information,”264 the new 
OIPR procedures would have the FISC balance the use of FISA 
materials “against the government’s need to obtain and use 
evidence for criminal prosecution.”265 
According to the FISC, the limits it set on the OIPR proce-
dures seek to avoid FISA activities where “criminal prosecutors 
direct both the intelligence and criminal investigations . . . 
[and] coordination becomes subordination of both investigations 
or interests to law enforcement objectives.”266 The court 
summed up the implications of the new procedures: 
[C]riminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps 
when they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance), 
what techniques to use, what information to look for, what informa-
tion to keep as evidence and when use of FISA can cease because 
there is enough evidence to arrest and prosecute.267  
The court feared that under the proposed procedures, 
prosecutors would have “every legal advantage conceived by 
Congress to be used by U.S. intelligence agencies to collect for-
eign intelligence information,” including the looser probable 
cause standard and “use of the most highly advanced and 
highly intrusive techniques for intelligence gathering.”268 The 
 
 261. Id. at 626–27. 
 262. Id. at 623. 
 263. Id. 
 264. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1821(4)(A) (2000). 
 265. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
 266. Id. at 623–24 (emphasis omitted). 
 267. Id. at 624. 
 268. Id. 
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FISC concluded by striking two paragraphs of the OIPR proce-
dures—those allowing criminal investigators to advise intelli-
gence officials concerning “the initiation, operation, continua-
tion, or expansion of FISA searches or surveillance”—and 
putting in their place a rule that law enforcement personnel 
should not “direct or control” the use of FISA procedures and a 
requirement that contacts between law enforcement and intel-
ligence personnel working on parallel FISA investigations be 
monitored by OIPR.269 
The three-judge FISA Court of Review abrogated this deci-
sion.270 The FISCR harshly repudiated the FISC and wrote that 
its decision “not only misinterpreted and misapplied minimiza-
tion procedures . . . [it] may well have exceeded the constitu-
tional bounds that restrict an Article III court.”271 The FISCR 
rejected the idea that there had ever been in FISA any dichot-
omy between law enforcement and collection of foreign intelli-
gence, before or after the Patriot Act.272 According to the Court 
of Review, the simple change to “a significant purpose” by the 
Patriot Act removed any cause the FISC may have had to 
weigh the government’s relative interests in law enforcement 
and foreign intelligence.273 However, the Court also found that 
the Patriot Act, to a limited extent, codified such a dichotomy, 
and that it must be enforced.274 Only if the government’s “sole 
objective” is to obtain evidence of a past crime would the FISC 
properly deny an application.275 
The FISCR reasoned that, because FISA defines the tar-
gets and information sought in close relation to national secu-
rity criminal activity, any use of the information collected from 
FISA surveillance, including prosecution, is permitted.276 How-
ever, the fact that “foreign intelligence information includes 
evidence of foreign intelligence crimes”277 does not determine 
the limits on law enforcement use of FISA materials. Nor does 
the use of FISA surveillance for prosecution necessarily invali-
 
 269. Id. at 623, 625 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 270. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 271. Id. at 731. 
 272. Id. at 725, 735. 
 273. Id. at 735. 
 274. Id. at 734–36. 
 275. Id. at 735–36 (“[T]he FISA process may not be used to investigate 
wholly unrelated ordinary crimes.”). 
 276. Id. at 731. 
 277. Id. at 724. 
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date the FISA activities. If the gathering of foreign intelligence 
is a significant purpose of the surveillance, the later use of 
FISA-derived information in a criminal prosecution will not 
taint the evidence.278 In short, the FISCR conflated what FISA 
information is used for with the purpose for using FISA.279 
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, some of the criminal 
convictions and appeals where FISA-derived evidence formed 
part of the basis for the prosecution upheld the use of the FISA 
evidence after finding that the surveillance was not “directed 
towards criminal investigation or the institution of a criminal 
prosecution.”280 Indeed, of the courts of appeal that reviewed 
FISA-related criminal convictions during this period, only the 
Sarkissian court “refuse[d] to draw too fine a distinction” be-
tween criminal and intelligence investigations.”281 The others 
endorsed the “primary purpose” test and, in doing so, presumed 
that a “wall” between the law enforcement and intelligence 
sides of an investigation existed.282 However, none of these 
courts suppressed evidence and none contradict that in OIPR 
and the Justice Department during that period a robust coordi-
nation between intelligence and law enforcement officials was 
ongoing.283 In short, the purpose requirement existed from the 
beginning, but the wall, misapprehended by the FISCR, came 
later. 
After the sudden death of OIPR head Mary Lawton in 
1993, Attorney General Janet Reno turned to her Florida col-
league and Assistant U.S. Attorney in Miami, Richard Scruggs, 
to head OIPR.284 Scruggs became concerned that there were no 
written guidelines governing contacts between the Criminal 
 
 278. See supra note 209 (citing decisions upholding the use of FISA proce-
dures and FISA-derived evidence in criminal prosecutions). 
 279. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 49 (1978) (“How this information may 
be used ‘to protect’ against clandestine intelligence activities is not prescribed 
by the definition of foreign intelligence information . . . . Obviously, use of [for-
eign intelligence] as evidence in a criminal trial is one way the government 
can lawfully protect against . . . international terrorism.”). 
 280. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1190 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 281. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 282. See United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075–76 (4th Cir. 1987); Duggan, 743 
F.2d at 77. 
 283. See Supplemental Brief for the United States, In re Sealed Case, 310 
F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. Sept. 25, 2002) (No. 02-001), available at http://www 
.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html. 
 284. See DOJ Moves, 8 DOJ ALERT 11 (May 2, 1994). 
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Division and the intelligence side of FBI, and, upon discovering 
that a warrantless physical search on the home of Aldrich 
Ames had been conducted, he worried that the “primary pur-
pose” analysis could be applied and thus compromise the crimi-
nal espionage case against Ames.285 Soon, Scruggs began im-
posing information-sharing procedures for FISA materials on 
his own.286 
Scruggs wrote a series of memoranda advocating guide-
lines for the separation of intelligence and criminal investiga-
tions, and in one of them he referred to his recommended pro-
cedures as establishing a “Chinese wall.”287 Thus, the origins of 
the 1995 guidelines and wall procedures that followed between 
then and 2002, reviewed above, were not, as the FISCR 
claimed, “shrouded in historical mist.”288 Nor did the wall’s con-
struction inside the Justice Department necessarily mean that 
FISA needed a statutory fix. 
During his argument before the FISCR, Solicitor Ted Olson 
noted that when it comes to the meaning of the Patriot Act 
amendments to FISA, “we’re not dealing with perfect clarity 
here.”289 Still, although the plain meaning of the amendment 
favors greater involvement by the Criminal Division in FISA 
investigations and more merged law enforcement and foreign 
intelligence investigations, the text does not support a con-
struction that allows the Criminal Division to direct and con-
trol the FISA activities pertinent to an investigation.290 The 
rule of construction disfavoring repeals by implication291 ap-
plies here—why should a simple change from “the purpose” to 
“a significant purpose” be construed to overturn twenty-five 
years of FISA understandings that the objective of the proce-
dures is to permit secret gathering of foreign intelligence? The 
change from “the” to “a” shows explicit recognition of the over-
lap between law enforcement and foreign intelligence, and 
“significant” qualifies the quantum of foreign intelligence that 
 
 285. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78; 2004 OIG RE-
PORT, supra note 168, at 25. 
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 288. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
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must be sought.292 The FISCR decision considerably weakened 
the foreign intelligence core of FISA. 
When the FISCR convened in 2002, it was undeniable that 
national security investigations often have multiple purposes. 
Moreover, because Congress has made many terrorist activities 
crimes, there is more than ever an overlap between foreign in-
telligence and law enforcement, even within the same investi-
gation and targets.293 Criminal prosecution supported by effec-
tive intelligence investigations can be an effective counter-
terrorism tactic.294 Still, as interpreted by the Court of Review, 
FISA can permit the government to skirt the statutory and 
constitutional protections afforded those subject to law en-
forcement investigations.295 FISA was created as a system for 
surveillance for foreign intelligence, not for solving crimes.296 
Outside that exceptional arena of foreign intelligence, the Con-
stitution before and after 1978 requires Fourth Amendment no-
tice to targets, Sixth Amendment confrontation of evidence, and 
First Amendment freedom of expression without a chill from 
the specter of looming FBI surveillance.297 
So understood, the wall is an essential part of the larger 
context for managing and implementing FISA, whether or not 
the pre- or post-Patriot Act language literally requires such 
separation.298 If something like the wall procedures are not in 
place, FISC-approved surveillance may violate the Constitution 
when the FBI begins an investigation principally to build a 
criminal case.299 
 
 292. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1177–81. 
 293. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 9. 
 294. See id. 
 295. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed 
Case, F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  
 296. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1320 (2004). 
 297. See id. at 1339–41 (discussing how the full protections of the American 
criminal justice system apply to targets of wiretaps in ordinary law enforce-
ment actions). 
 298. See RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE 
SYSTEM IN THE THROES OF REFORM 112–13 (2006) (“[The FBI] incorrectly be-
lieves that intelligence is a natural outgrowth of traditional criminal investi-
gative practices.”); id. at 134 (“The Bureau has a history of redefining criminal 
investigations as intelligence operations in order to use FISA warrants and 
NSA intercepts to obtain information for use in drug or other ordinary-crimes 
investigations.”). 
 299. See Swire, supra note 296, at 1361. 
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B. AVOIDANCE OF FISA: THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM 
On December 11, 2005, the New York Times publicly re-
vealed what the Bush administration later called the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (TSP), when it reported that President 
Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) 
to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States 
to search for evidence of terrorist activity without judicial ap-
proval.300 In a letter from the Justice Department to the con-
gressional intelligence committees a few days later, the Assis-
tant Attorney General stated that a secret order from the 
President authorized the program shortly after September 11, 
and that the surveillance is aimed at “certain international 
communications into and out of the United States of people 
linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.”301 
Since beginning the program, NSA has monitored the tele-
phone and e-mail communications of thousands of persons in-
side the United States where one end of the communication is 
outside the United States, without warrants.302 Aside from de-
fending the program as “crucial to our national security,”303 the 
President lamented “the unauthorized disclosure of this effort 
. . . . Revealing classified information is illegal, alerts our ene-
mies, and endangers our country.”304 
While the Justice Department launched an investigation of 
the leak,305 the administration defended the legality of the TSP 
in the face of widespread criticism in Congress, lawsuits by civil 
liberties organizations and defendants who have challenged 
their previous pleas or convictions, and countless op-ed attacks, 
blog debates, and other commentary.306 Many of us wondered—
in light of the win/loss record of the government before the 
 
 300. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23. Although details of the NSA 
program remain classified, press reports indicate that data mining and traffic 
analysis technologies are being employed. Shane Harris, How Does the NSA 
Spy?, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 20, 2006, at 47, 49. 
 301. Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts, supra note 24, at 1. 
 302. Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Pri-
vacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking under the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253, 289 (2006). 
 303. Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts, supra note 24, at 1. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Toni Locy, Justice Dept. Opens Domestic Spying Probe, BREIT-
BART.COM, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/12/30/ 
D8EQLIAGB.html. 
 306. See infra notes 300–05 and accompanying text. 
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FISC, why would the administration not rely on a sure thing? 
How could the President have stated in 2004 that “any time 
you hear the United States government talking about wiretap, 
it requires . . . a court order. Nothing has changed. When we’re 
talking about chasing down terrorists, we’re talking about get-
ting a court order before we do so.”307 
When critics pointed out the obvious—that secret elec-
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence inside the United 
States is provided for by FISA—the administration defended 
the decision not to rely on the FISA processes. Given the ex-
pansiveness of the definition of “electronic surveillance” in 
FISA,308 the “exclusivity” provisions of FISA and the companion 
criminal enforcement statute,309 and the criminal penalties for 
unauthorized electronic surveillance,310 the administration 
faced an uphill legal climb. FISA provides criminal penalties 
for anyone who engages in electronic surveillance “not author-
ized by statute.”311 The administration has argued that the Au-
thorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) constitutes 
the necessary authorization within the meaning of the FISA 
“authorized by statute” provision.312 The text and legislative 
history clearly reveal, however, that the purpose of the FISA 
provision is to provide security to intelligence personnel who 
act in accordance with FISA, not to immunize them if they vio-
late the law.313 The “statute” referred to in section 1809 is 
FISA, or Title III.314 Similarly, the administration’s claims of 
AUMF authority would make the exclusivity provision in FISA 
meaningless.315 
Attorney General Gonzales emphasized the need for “speed 
and agility” in making judgments about particular intercepts, 
 
 307. President’s Remarks in a Discussion on the PATRIOT Act in Buffalo, 
New York, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 641 (Apr. 20, 2004). 
 308. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f ) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 309. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e)–(f ) (2000 & Supp. II 2003). 
 310. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. III 2004). 
 311. Id. 
 312.  Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts, supra note 24, at 2. 
 313. See generally NSA III: War Time Executive Power and the FISA Court: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 812 (2006) [here-
inafter Statement of David S. Kris] (statement of David S. Kris, Senior Vice 
President, Time Warner Inc.), available at http://www.balkin.blogspot.com/ 
kris.testimony.pdf (discussing how Congress intended for FISA’s procedures to 
be the exclusive means for conducting foreign electronic surveillance). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
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and he maintained that “navigat[ing] through the FISA proc-
ess” would delay the work and produce “critical holes in our 
early warning system.”316 Acknowledging the emergency au-
thorizations expressly contemplated in FISA, the Attorney 
General implied that the required procedures were too burden-
some or that, perhaps, they could not be met. Gonzales noted 
that he would have to sign off on each application, as would the 
lawyers at NSA and Justice Department, after determining 
that “all provisions of FISA have been satisfied.”317 Although 
Gonzales did not clearly state whether it was the anticipated 
failure to meet the probable cause requirement of FISA or the 
burden of work to meet the seventy-two-hour deadline that led 
the administration to go outside FISA, Deputy Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, General Michael V. Hayden stated at about 
the same time that the administration had unilaterally adopted 
a “reasonable suspicion” standard in applying the TSP because 
the “probable cause” standard in FISA is, in the words of one 
commentator, “too onerous.”318 
The administration passed up an invitation to revise the 
predicate probable cause standard in 2002. Legislation pro-
posed by Senator Michael DeWine would have substituted a 
“reasonable suspicion” standard for “probable cause” to believe 
that the surveillance target is a foreign power or agent of a for-
eign power for FISA surveillance requests involving non-United 
States persons.319 When asked to advise Congress on the pro-
posed amendment, James A. Baker, then head of OIPR in the 
Justice Department, gatekeeper of the FISA process, opined 
that the Patriot Act extension of the emergency surveillance 
window from twenty-four to seventy-two hours “has allowed us 
to make full and effective use of FISA’s pre-existing emergency 
provisions to ensure that the government acts swiftly to re-
 
 316. Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks for Attorney Gen-
eral Alberto R. Gonzales at the Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 24, 
2006) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0601241 
.html [hereinafter Gonzales, Georgetown Remarks]. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Unclaimed Territory, The Administration’s New FISA Defense is Fac-
tually False, http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/02/adminstrations-new 
-fisa-defense-is.html (Jan. 24, 2006, 16:11 EST) [hereinafter Unclaimed Terri-
tory]. 
 319. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing on 
S. 2586 and S. 2659 Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 12 
(2002) (statement of Sen. Michael DeWine), available at http://intelligence 
.senate.gov/fisa.pdf. 
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spond to terrorist threats.”320 Baker testified that the Justice 
Department would not support Senator DeWine’s proposal—
because the probable cause standard was likely not an obstacle 
to effective use of FISA, and because the Department worried 
that the reasonable suspicion standard might be unconstitu-
tional.321 The executive branch thus expressed concern that a 
lowered standard might be unconstitutional at the same time 
they were engaged in just that practice. Admittedly, the 
DeWine proposal would have loosened the predicate only for 
non-United States persons. The TSP does not distinguish 
United States persons from others, and it forgoes the FISC 
oversight that the lower standard would continue to provide. 
Attorney General Gonzales also asserted that seeking leg-
islative authority for the TSP would have tipped off the ene-
mies and let them know what surveillance activities we were 
pursuing.322 Although Gonzales stated that the administration 
had been “advised that [it] would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble”323 to obtain such an amendment to FISA, he apparently re-
ferred not to the political or legal difficulties such a proposal 
would face, but to the concern that such an amendment could 
not be obtained “without jeopardizing the existence of the pro-
gram.”324 For example, once the administration admitted the 
program’s existence and cautioned that the program only inter-
cepted international calls, in theory those who subject to the 
surveillance could evade the program through countermea-
sures, such as use of VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) phones 
with U.S. numbers but used abroad.325 
Putting to one side the possibility of legislation being con-
sidered in executive session, with classified information se-
cured and sources and methods protected pursuant to House 
and Senate rules, and despite some briefings on the TSP to se-
 
 320. Id. at 23 (statement of James A. Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Pol-
icy, Dep’t of Justice). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Press Briefing, Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., Gen. Michael V. Hay-
den, Principal Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html [hereinaf-
ter Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden]. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. VoIP telephone technology permits the user to mask his location be-
cause the phone number where the call originates may be a U.S. number from 
wherever the call is placed. See FCC, Voice over Internet Protocol Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.fcc.gov/voip/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
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lected members, Congress did not know what NSA was doing in 
the TSP. By statute the President is required to keep the con-
gressional intelligence committees “fully and currently in-
formed” of the intelligence activities of the United States, in-
cluding any “significant anticipated intelligence activity.”326 For 
covert actions, the President is permitted, in order “to meet ex-
traordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the 
United States” to limit reporting to select members of the Con-
gressional intelligence committees and the leaders of the House 
and the Senate—“Gang of Eight.”327 Reportedly, the TSP was 
briefed only to the Gang of Eight, and the eight were forbidden 
from sharing information about the program with colleagues, 
including members of the intelligence committees.328 However, 
as described by the administration, the TSP is an intelligence 
collection program, not a covert action program. As defined by 
statute, covert action does not include those “activities the pri-
mary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence.”329 As such, 
the TSP had to be disclosed to the intelligence committees. 
The only plausible legal cover for the truncated notice and 
briefing to Congress is that the reporting requirements for in-
telligence collection activities are binding “[t]o the extent con-
sistent with due regard for the protection of unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information relating to sensitive 
intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensi-
tive matters.”330 If that is the explanation, however, some form 
of limited notice would be justified only for the particularly 
sensitive aspects of the program, not the fact of its existence. 
The administration claims that the TSP was regularly vet-
ted by lawyers at the Department of Justice.331 Newsweek 
magazine reported, however, that dissension over the TSP in-
side the Department spilled over when then Deputy Attorney 
General James Comey refused to authorize the NSA program 
during a period when Attorney General Ashcroft was in the 
hospital with a serious medical condition.332 When Comey re-
 
 326. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. III 2004). 
 327. Id. § 413b(c)(2). 
 328. Press Release, Sen. John D. (Jay) Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman 
Rockefeller Reacts to Reports of NSA Intercept Program in United States (Dec. 
19, 2005), available at http://www.senate.gov/~rockefeller/news/2005/ 
pr121905a.html. 
 329. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). 
 330. Id. § 413a(a). 
 331. See Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 322. 
 332. Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt: They Were Loyal Conservatives, 
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fused to sign off on the program, a White House delegation, in-
cluding then White House Counsel Gonzales, visited Ashcroft 
in the hospital to appeal Comey’s decision, with apparent suc-
cess.333 Vetted or not, administration admissions that wholly 
domestic calls might have been monitored in the larger sweep 
for terrorist activities contradict the claim that the only calls to 
or from persons and locations overseas are monitored.334 
Those who characterize the TSP as a complex and techno-
logically advanced data mining program that simply cannot be 
fitted inside the obsolete structure of FISA take a different 
path.335 Apart from the Attorney General and the President fal-
ling back on the need for “speed and agility,” and stating that 
the war we are fighting is “a different war,” many advocates of 
the TSP say, quite simply, that the law has failed to keep up 
with the technology.336 However, according to General Hayden, 
who was head of NSA when the program was implemented, 
TSP “is not a driftnet over Dearborn or Lackawanna or Free-
mont, grabbing conversations that we then sort out by these al-
leged keyword searches or data-mining tools. . . . This is tar-
geted and focused.”337 Hayden claimed the surveillance was 
limited to “international calls and only those we have a reason-
able basis to believe involve al Qaeda or one of its affiliates.”338 
Hayden was blunt: “we’re not there sucking up coms and then 
using some of these magically alleged keyword searches—Did 
he say ‘jihad’?”339 Instead, a shift supervisor at NSA substitutes 
for a federal judge.340 She decides what part of the product of 
the data-mining merits further targeted surveillance, and the 
 
and Bush Appointees. They Fought a Quiet battle to Rein in the President’s 
Power in the War on Terror. And They Paid a Price for It. A Newsweek Investi-
gation, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 34, 39. 
 333. Id. 
 334. See Stewart M. Powell, White House Acknowledges Some Taps Wholly 
Domestic, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2005, at A6. 
 335. Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 322. 
 336. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., A New Surveillance Act, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16; K.A. Taipale & James Jay Carafano, Op-Ed., Fix-
ing Surveillance, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www 
.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20060124-104527. 
 337. General M. Powell, Principal Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Ad-
dress to the National Press Club (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.fas 
.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
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standard she employs in making those decisions is reasonable 
suspicion instead of probable cause.341 
The legality of the TSP was thus defended by the Adminis-
tration at the same time that it admitted, in effect, that the 
program does not comply with FISA. Nor did the Administra-
tion fulfill congressional reporting requirements for intelligence 
collection activities. Whether officials substituted a “reasonable 
suspicion” standard or some other criterion in deciding who to 
target with TSP, the substitution of an NSA employee for a 
federal judge as the gatekeeper is a startling departure from 
the regularized procedures of FISA. 
C. SYNTHESIZING THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DEVELOPMENTS: 
THE DEATH OF FISA 
The inter-branch compromise that produced FISA contains 
a series of interlocking elements. FISA required a form of prior 
judicial approval to intercept electronic communications inside 
the United States, except in emergencies.342 The interception 
had to be targeted at particular persons or places related to 
suspected terrorism or espionage.343 The predicate for issuing a 
court order was a showing of probable cause of foreign agency 
and that foreign intelligence will be acquired,344 and Congress 
determined in 1978 that these parameters were the exclusive 
means for carrying our electronic surveillance for foreign intel-
ligence inside the United States.345 A fully informed Congress 
was to oversee all of the above.346 
Part B showed that amendments to the Act, judicial deci-
sions, or executive practice have already undercut some of 
these elements of FISA. Others remained arguably intact until 
the TSP emerged, and Congress prepared to bargain away the 
important remaining pieces of FISA. The two sea-change devel-
opments explored here—dismantling of the foreign intelligence 
“purpose” screening requirements and the NSA Terrorist Sur-
veillance Program—should not be understood as the only 
causes of the death of FISA. Larger institutional and societal 
 
 341. Id. 
 342. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f ) (2000). 
 343. Id.  § 1805(a)(3). 
 344. Id. 
 345. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2004). 
 346. 50 U.S.C. §§ 413(a)(1), 1807–1808 (2000). 
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atmospherics, particularly in the last five years, place the de-
mise of FISA in context. 
An overriding aura of emergency has driven the post-
September 11 counter-terrorism programs, including the 
Patriot Act,347 the FISCR decision,348 and the NSA program.349 
The Bush administration effectively has sustained the emer-
gency through its global war on terrorism and the war in Iraq, 
and Congress and the courts have altered their perspectives in 
light of it.350 One result is that the central lesson of the Keith 
case has been lost—that the societal interests in security and 
civil liberties must be balanced, with the participation of the 
federal courts.351 In a 2006 insider’s account by Professor John 
Yoo of his experiences inside the Justice Department in helping 
to shape the post-September 11 programs, Yoo maintained that 
“FISA . . . was created specifically to hamstring the executive 
branch in favor of civil liberties.”352 Professor Yoo’s revisionist 
history is emblematic of the change in orientation of govern-
ment after September 11, a change also expressed in the opin-
ion of the FISA Court of Review. In rejecting the opinion signed 
by all of the FISC judges, the Court of Review essentially took 
the core out of FISA when it opined that the Justice Depart-
ment would have free rein in deciding when to use the FISA 
procedures.353 
During the same period, Congress effectively ceded its role 
in leadership.354 The executive branch devised the policies it 
wished to follow after September 11, and it set in place the pro-
grams and enforcement activities to meet the policy objectives. 
 
 347. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2000). 
 348. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 349. See Harris, supra note 300, at 47. 
 350. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23, at A16 (discussing how the NSA 
program reflects a major shift in American intelligence gather practices). 
 351. See id. at A1 (discussing the difficulty of identifying a line between 
national security interests and the rights of Americans against undue 
searches). 
 352. YOO, supra note 206, at 73. 
 353. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 731–32. 
 354. See Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann, When Congress Checks 
Out, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 67, 68 (“In the past six years, 
Congressional oversight of the executive . . . on foreign and national security 
policy . . . has virtually collapsed.”). 
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1. The Wall 
In early oversight hearings on the implementation of FISA, 
Senator Malcolm Wallop expressed the view that the “net effect 
[of FISA] has been to confuse intelligence gathering with 
criminal law” and that it is “nonsense” to attempt a formula for 
comprehensive surveillance of those who constitute a security 
threat.355 Nonetheless, the FISA process worked reasonably 
well. Evidence impermissibly gathered through FISA surveil-
lance did not taint affected criminal prosecutions because the 
“primary purpose” rule was workable in practice. At the same 
time, direction and control from the law enforcement side of the 
Justice Department did not encumber the foreign intelligence 
investigators. 
Within days of September 11, FISA became a convenient 
foil for those seeking to explain our government’s failure to stop 
the hijackers. It became part of the urban myth surrounding 
September 11 that the FISA wall caused the government to 
lose contact with suspected terrorists,356 and most notoriously, 
that the FISA wall was blamed for the failure to secure FISA 
surveillance of then supposed twentieth hijacker Zacarias 
Moussaoui’s laptop computer in the days and weeks before Sep-
tember 11.357 Moussaoui was arrested on an immigration over-
stay charge in August 2001. A flight instructor at a flight train-
ing school in Minnesota grew suspicious when Moussaoui said 
that he wanted to learn to fly large jet aircraft, but that he had 
no interest in becoming a commercial pilot.358 
 
 355. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, S. REP. NO. 97-691, at 9–
10 (1982). 
 356. See YOO, supra note 206, at 72 (“I was asked to work on fixing the 
most important defect in our intelligence laws—the legal ‘Wall’ . . . . the Wall 
had played a role in our failure to stop the 9/11 attacks.”). 
 357. See JOINT INQUIRY STAFF, 107TH CONG., THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE 
PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF ZACARIAS 
MOUSSAOUI PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 14 (2d Sess. 2002) (statement of 
Eleanor Hill, Staff Dir., Joint Inquiry Staff ) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY STAFF 
MEMORANDUM], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/ 
092402hill_pdf. 
 358. Press Release, Pan Am Int’l Flight Acad., Pan Am International Flight 
Academy Statement to the News Media, http://www.panamacademy.com/ 
template_press.asp?id=119 (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). The Minneapolis Star 
Tribune quoted the flight instructor as telling the FBI, “Do you realize how 
serious this is? . . . This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with 
fuel could be used as a weapon!” Greg Gordon, A Persistent Suspicion: Eagan 
Flight Trainer Wouldn’t Let Unease About Suspect Rest, STAR TRIB., Dec. 21, 
2001, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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When field agents sought the headquarters’ approval for a 
FISA surveillance order, they were turned down, because there 
was insufficient information connecting Moussaoui to a foreign 
power.359 However, the headquarters’ agents only orally briefed 
the lawyers responsible for making the foreign agency recom-
mendation. If the agents had searched FBI computer records 
relevant to the Moussaoui request, they would have had access 
to a July 2001 memorandum from a Phoenix agent that warned 
about the potential dangers of al Qaeda affiliates seeking train-
ing at U.S. flight schools.360 FBI personnel did not follow up on 
the memorandum, and no senior officials at the Bureau saw the 
memorandum before September 11.361 In addition, the head-
quarters’ staff lawyers apparently mistakenly advised the Min-
neapolis agents that foreign agency required a link to a terror-
ist organization on the State Department list of terrorist 
organizations.362 At about the same time, the FBI received a 
classified cable from a French intelligence agency that warned 
the Moussaoui had “Islamic extremist beliefs.”363 If the French 
intelligence had been coupled with the Phoenix memorandum, 
the fact-sensitive foreign agency inquiry might have produced a 
different outcome. But the two sources together would have 
only suggested that Moussaoui was affiliated with al Qaeda 
and thus had a connection to a foreign power.364 
The Minnesota agents did not open a criminal investiga-
tion that would have permitted a search of Moussaoui’s laptop 
because FBI headquarters believed that the agents lacked suf-
ficient probable cause of a crime.365 A criminal case was opened 
and a FISA order was obtained, but only after the September 
 
 359. JOINT INQUIRY STAFF MEMORANDUM, supra note 357, at 17. 
 360. See Shelby, supra note 15, at 29. 
 361. Id. at 29–30. 
 362. Id. at 53. 
 363. David Johnston & Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Curbed Scrutiny of Man Now 
a Suspect in the Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at A1. Professor Yoo 
slightly alters the reported facts regarding Moussaoui and writes that Mous-
saoui “had connections to extreme Islamic groups.” YOO, supra note 206, at 80. 
It was precisely the lack of demonstrated ties to any foreign power that caused 
headquarters to decline to pursue a FISA application. 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 167, at 274. 
 364. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 272. On September 13, 
the British government received and passed on to the United States intelli-
gence that Moussaoui had attended an al Qaeda training camp in Afghani-
stan. Id. Obviously, if this information had been available in August, the 
predicate for FISA surveillance would have existed. Id. at 275. 
 365. Id. at 273–74. 
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11 attacks.366 Although the 9/11 Commission later found that a 
“maximum U.S. effort” to investigate Moussaoui “might have 
brought investigators to the core of the 9/11 plot,” the Commis-
sion refused to blame any shortcomings in investigating Mous-
saoui on the “purpose” requirement or the wall procedures im-
plementing FISA.367 Nonetheless, the Moussaoui story emerged 
as a symbol of the supposed dysfunctional state of intelligence 
sharing in Washington and it became part of the urban myth 
that helped spur enactment of the Patriot Act.368 
Professor John Yoo helped reinforce the mythical stature of 
the wall. He blamed “[s]trict enforcement of the Wall between 
law enforcement and foreign intelligence” for preventing the 
CIA from sharing photos with the FBI showing a meeting be-
tween eventual hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar and al Qaeda op-
eratives involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.369 According 
to Professor Yoo, because the Cole bombing investigation was 
run by the FBI Criminal Division, the CIA refused to share its 
intelligence photos “because of the Wall.”370 When Mihdhar en-
tered the U.S. again on July 4, 2001, CIA and FBI counter-
terror agents knew of his al Qaeda connection and tried to lo-
cate him, but they refused to share their information with the 
FBI criminal agents in New York.371 The FBI criminal agent 
working on the Cole investigation replied angrily in an e-mail 
message that “whatever has happened to this—someday some-
one will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand 
why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we 
had at certain ‘problems.’”372 
The FBI agent’s frustration is palpable and understand-
able, but Professor Yoo’s attribution of blame to FISA or any 
legal procedures implementing FISA is misplaced. After hear-
ing testimony from the relevant officials, including Attorney 
General Ashcroft,373 the 9/11 Commission concluded that in the 
 
 366. Id. at 276. 
 367. Id. (stating that the connection between Moussaoui and al Qaeda was 
“not an easy trail to find”). 
 368. See generally Craig S. Lerner, Calling a Truce in the Culture Wars: 
From Enron to the CIA, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 277, 277–78 (2006) (discuss-
ing the public’s view of the intelligence failure). 
 369. YOO, supra note 206, at 80. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 80–81. 
 372. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 271. 
 373. Id. at 439 (listing the witnesses who testified in front of the Commis-
sion). 
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Mihdhar case “everyone involved was confused about the rules 
governing the sharing and use of information gathered in intel-
ligence channels.”374 A criminal investigation had already been 
opened on the Cole bombing, and Mihdhar could have been in-
vestigated and tracked as part of that case.375 Unfortunately, 
either the FBI intelligence agent that possessed information 
about Mihdhar or a Bureau lawyer who advised her incorrectly 
determined that the intelligence could not be shared with the 
criminal investigators. 
The FISA wall procedures were designed to protect against 
using the secretive foreign intelligence collection process in or-
der to build a criminal case.376 FISA never stood in the way of 
the sharing of criminal information with intelligence investiga-
tors.377 Nor did it apply to the sharing of intelligence informa-
tion with criminal investigators, so long as the sharing met the 
foreign intelligence purpose rule.378  
The 1995 procedures governed sharing with prosecutors, 
not other FBI agents.379 Ironically, the intelligence concerning 
Mihdhar came from NSA and was ordered by Attorney General 
Reno, pursuant to Executive Order 12,333.380 In what the 9/11 
Commission called an “overabundance of caution. . . [d]uring 
the millennium crisis,”381 the Attorney General ordered over-
seas electronic surveillance of three U.S. persons with the pro-
viso that the results not be shared with criminal investigators 
or prosecutors without the permission of OIPR.382 Even though 
the restrictions did not apply to the Mihdhar surveillance, NSA 
placed the restrictions on all of the agency’s bin Laden-related 
reporting.383 Attorney General Ashcroft testified before the 9/11 
Commission that these information sharing problems were at-
tributable to the 1995 guidelines.384 The Commission disagreed 
and found that, “[w]hatever the merits of the . . . 1995 . . . pro-
cedures . . . , they did not apply to the information the analyst 
 
 374. Id. at 271. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Banks, supra note 16, at 1152–53. 
 377. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 538 n.80. 
 378. Id. 
 379. 2004 OIG REPORT, supra note 168, at 27. 
 380. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,951 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 381. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 537, n.71. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. at 539 n.83. 
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decided she could not share with the criminal agent.”385 In 
short, “a bureaucratic culture,” not legal restrictions, prevented 
the sharing of intelligence that might have led investigators to 
at least one of the September 11 hijackers before the attacks.386 
Once the Patriot Act was implemented, the supposed gains 
in counter-terrorism prosecutions that came from lowering the 
wall were showcased in the February 2003 indictment of Sami 
Al-Arian and others in Florida, based on allegations that they 
financed suicide bombings in Israel.387 Attorney General 
Ashcroft maintained at the news conference that the investiga-
tors had been “stymied” by restrictions on the use of foreign in-
telligence in criminal cases and that the expanded powers 
granted by the Patriot Act allowed them to proceed with the 
prosecution.388 In fact, the FBI began investigating Al-Arian in 
the early 1990s and began FISA-approved electronic surveil-
lance in the same period.389 Some of the material that prosecu-
tors used to bring their indictment was ten years old, and it 
included much that is foreign intelligence as defined in FISA.390 
It was false to imply that the pre-Patriot Act FISA inhibited 
building a criminal case against Al-Arian and his co-
conspirators.391 So long as the investigators sought the FISA 
surveillance for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, 
the Department did not run afoul of FISA and it was not ham-
strung by FISA in bringing its criminal prosecution.392 
As the Patriot Act sunsets loomed in 2005 and then were 
extended by temporary legislation into early 2006,393 serious 
consideration was never given to revisiting the “significant 
 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. (“Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information the 
analyst possessed could not have been shared with the criminal agent.”). 
 387. Eric Lichtblau & Judith Miller, Indictment Ties U.S. Professor to Ter-
ror Group, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at A1. 
 388. See Banks supra note 16, at 1188; John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., 
Press Conference (Feb. 20, 2003) (transcript available at http:// 
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/20/se.04.html). 
 389. Banks, supra note 16, at 1188. 
 390. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. 1801(e) (2000) (defining foreign intelligence).  
 391. Banks, supra note 16, at 1188–89. 
 392. Id. at 1189. 
 393. Emergency legislation first extended the sunset provisions until Feb-
ruary 3, 2006. Extension of the Sunset of Certain Provisions of the USA PA-
TRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 109-160 § 1, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005). A second act ex-
tended the provisions until March 10, 2006. Extension of Sunset of Certain 
Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 109-170 § 1, 120 Stat. 3 
(2006). 
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purpose” language or to clarifying the reason for the “purpose” 
language. Instead, after compromises were made to revise the 
authorities for National Security Letters and business re-
cords,394 the sunset on the significant purpose provision and 
twelve of fourteen other Patriot Act authorities subject to sun-
set were simply repealed.395 
The reauthorization and lifting of the sunset on “signifi-
cant purpose” only underscores that the Patriot Act change was 
not legally necessary or sufficient to eliminate the wall. The 
amendment was not necessary because the obstacles to sharing 
information or integrating data are not the product of legal 
rules.396 A change would not have been sufficient to overcome 
the Fourth Amendment requirement that relaxed approval 
processes for electronic surveillance be reserved for when the 
purpose is collection of foreign intelligence.397 
The Supreme Court has never upheld warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance inside the United States.398 If criminal 
prosecutors were permitted to initiate, direct, and control war-
rantless electronic surveillance and then use the information so 
collected as prosecution evidence, they would be circumventing 
the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements by using al-
ternate procedures allowed specifically for foreign intelligence 
to develop a criminal prosecution.399 However, the Supreme 
 
 394. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USA PATRIOT ACT: BACK-
GROUND AND COMPARISON OF HOUSE- AND SENATE-APPROVED REAUTHORIZA-
TION AND RELATED LEGISLATIVE ACTION 12–13 (2005) (listing the differences 
between the House and Senate resolutions). 
 395. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-177 § 102(a), 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006). A new sunset of December 
31, 2009 was approved for surveillance of suspected “lone wolf ” terrorists. Id.  
§ 103. 
 396. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 539 n.83 (stating that 
there was “no legal reason” why information could not be shared). 
 397. Compare United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321 
(1972) (rejecting warrantless wiretapping of a domestic group engaged in na-
tional security crimes), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967) 
(no exception to the traditional warrant requirement for electronic surveil-
lance), and Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 
GEO. WASH L. REV. 1264, 1299–1304 (2004) (arguing for a return to the pre-
Patriot Act “primary purpose” standard for FISA surveillance), with AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 31 (1997) (claim-
ing that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness, not probable cause 
and a warrant). 
 398. See, e.g., Keith, 407 U.S. at 321. 
 399. Id. at 316–17 (“[Unreviewed discretion] may yield too readily to pres-
sures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of pri-
vacy and protected speech.”). 
BANKS_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM 
1268 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1209 
 
Court’s recognized in the Keith decision that traditional Fourth 
Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements may not 
be compatible with the needs of national security surveillance 
and that different standards might be constitutionally permis-
sible if they are reasonable.400 FISA incorporated these con-
cerns and reflects Congress’s recognition of the real world diffi-
culties of separating the foreign intelligence and law 
enforcement components of an investigation concerning inter-
national terrorism. Although the prosecution does not actually 
initiate and direct a FISA investigation, the significant purpose 
amendment to FISA does allow prosecutors access to FISA-
derived evidence in the criminal case.401  
Nor did FISA, before or after the Patriot Act, prevent the 
government from using FISA-authorized surveillance against a 
defendant in a criminal case.402 In fact, evidence obtained 
through FISA surveillance has often been used in criminal 
prosecutions.403 In a number of cases discussed in this Article, 
convicted terrorists have appealed in part on grounds that in-
criminating evidence obtained through FISC-approved surveil-
lance should not have been admitted because it was acquired in 
order to build the criminal cases, and the criminal warrant 
process was not followed.404 The courts of appeals have consis-
tently rejected these arguments.405 The Sarkissian court re-
fused “to draw too fine a distinction between criminal and intel-
ligence investigations,” and it noted that the investigation of 
international terrorism necessarily requires investigation of 
criminal activities.406 So long as the purpose of launching the 
FISA surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence, the fact that 
the government later chooses to prosecute the target does not 
undercut the lawfulness of the FISA surveillance. 
 
 400. See id. at 322–23. 
 401. See Swire, supra note 296, at 1330–31 (noting that the amendment 
was promulgated to allow information sharing between criminal and foreign 
intelligence investigations). 
 402. Banks, supra note 16, at 1189. 
 403. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 
959 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 404. See, e.g., Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 332; Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 961; 
Duggan, 743 F.2d at 64–65. 
 405. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 333–34; Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 964–65; 
Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78. 
 406. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965. 
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To argue, as some did in the Patriot Act reauthorization 
debates, that the modern blending of crimes and foreign intelli-
gence threats should be reason enough to eliminate the wall 
provisions.407 However, this fails to take into account that the 
purpose requirement focuses on the investigators’ reason for 
seeking a FISA order, not on what is done with the product of 
the surveillance.408 If the purpose of the investigation is to 
prosecute, FISA should be unavailable, given its requirements 
and protections of the Fourth, Sixth, and First Amendments.409 
If the purpose is to monitor conversations toward understand-
ing a terrorist threat, FISA may be used if its requirements are 
otherwise met. If both objectives are present, responsible offi-
cials should weigh which purpose is dominant and use the ap-
propriate path toward authorized surveillance. The 2001 
amendment and its 2006 codification did not tear down the 
wall; nor did the 1978 purpose language build it. Nor could 
these phrases in FISA knock down a set of protections that the 
Constitution requires. 
Within a few months of the FISCR decision,410 the Justice 
Department reported to the House Judiciary Committee that 
the procedures approved by the FISCR greatly improved the 
way that investigations are conducted, in terms of efficiency, 
order, and effectiveness.411 Approximately 4500 open intelli-
gence files were shared with criminal prosecutors during that 
several month period.412 In 2003, the FBI issued a directive, the 
Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS), which 
requires law enforcement and intelligence investigators to work 
together as part of the same teams investigating terrorism.413 
 
 407. Kate Martin & Viet Dinh, Section 203: Authority to Share Criminal 
Investigative Information, in PATRIOT DEBATES: EXPERTS DEBATE THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT 12 (Stewart A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005) (“Even the 
most strident opponents of the USA PATRIOT ACT would not want another 
terrorist attack to occur because law enforcement and intelligence communi-
ties were prevented from talking to each other.”). This rhetoric obscures the 
fact that FISA did not prevent such sharing of information. In re Sealed Case, 
310 F.3d 717, 727 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  
 408. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1158 (discussing the focus of the primary 
purpose provision). 
 409. See Swire, supra note 296, at 1361. 
 410. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717. 
 411. Letter from Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Chairman, House Comm. Judiciary 
15–16 (May 13, 2003). 
 412. Id. at 16. 
 413. See Dan Eggen, FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance, WASH. POST, 
BANKS_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM 
1270 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1209 
 
All terrorism investigations are “handled from the outset like 
an intelligence or espionage investigation,” run out of the  
counter-terrorism division at the FBI, and investigators from 
the blended teams may use FISA processes.414 One aim of the 
new system is to deemphasize criminal prosecution in favor of 
longer term surveillance, although prosecutors that bring 
criminal charges will be able to use FISA surveillance at 
trial.415 
In September 2005 testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, a senior FBI official stated that the Patriot Act, the 
Ashcroft information sharing procedures, and the FISCR deci-
sion “removed real and perceived barriers to coordination” 
among the FBI and other intelligence agencies.416 In a Septem-
ber 2006 release the Justice Department reported an increase 
of more than 122 percent in court-approved FISA applications 
between 2001 and 2005, with anticipated 10 percent growth for 
2006.417 In addition, since 2004 the Department had reduced 
the backlog of pending FISA requests by about 60 percent, and 
reduced the number of days it takes to process FISA requests 
by 35 percent.418 The size of the lawyer staff at OIPR was tri-
pled during the same period, and standardized pleadings and 
automated drafting have made FISA filings shorter and easier 
to produce.419 
Former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker maintained 
that the wall was born out of fear.420 Baker believed that 
agency professionals “were focused on the hypothetical risk to 
privacy if foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement 
were allowed to mix” and on the chance “that years of success-
ful collaboration would end in disaster if the results of a single 
collaboration could be painted as a privacy scandal.”421 What-
ever the motivation, Baker is surely correct that the wall was 
deeply embedded in the FISA culture when these decisions 
 
Dec. 13, 2003, at A1.  
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 35 (2005) (statement of Gary M. Bald, 
Executive Assistant Dir., Nat’l Sec. Branch, FBI). 
 417. DOJ, FACT SHEET, supra note 6. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Stewart Baker, Wall Nuts, SLATE, Dec. 31, 2003, http://www.slate 
.com/id/2093344/. 
 421. Id. 
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were rendered in 2002.422 The FISC did not see the risk identi-
fied by Baker as hypothetical, and it had long experience in 
managing the FISA process.423 The FISCR appeared to side 
with Baker, but it had never seen a FISA application before.424 
If the FISCR decision is forming the basis for implementing 
FISA now, the FBI is permitted to obtain FISC permission to 
conduct a secret electronic surveillance or search for the pri-
mary purpose of investigating a crime even though there is no 
probable cause to suspect the commission of a crime. 
2. Statutory Obsolescence and Lone Wolf 
One by-product of the compromising that was necessary to 
produce FISA was a set of definitions and procedures that were 
difficult to understand and apply, even in the beginning.425 As 
sometimes happens with major legislation that is complicated 
at the outset, amendments are made and, over time, what was 
complex becomes hopelessly complex. 
In addition, the investigative resources directed at counter-
ing terrorism have grown considerably, and their orientation 
has shifted. In the years since FISA was implemented, Con-
gress has, often at the behest of the executive branch, criminal-
ized more and more national security and terrorism-related 
conduct, adding hundreds of new offenses to the federal crimi-
nal code.426 As a result, in the universe of foreign intelligence 
surveillance, a law enforcement purpose for the surveillance in-
evitably occupies a larger portion of the whole than it once did. 
The challenges in sorting out what should be FISA surveillance 
and what should follow the law enforcement model are greater 
now than they were in 1978. 
As terrorism overtook espionage as the dominant foreign 
intelligence collection challenge, the foreign power and agent of 
a foreign power concepts did not align easily with targeting ob-
jectives.427 The growing criminalization of terrorism made the 
 
 422. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 423. Banks, supra note 16, at 1167–71. 
 424. See id. at 1171–74. 
 425. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1161–62 (describing early difficulties of 
overlapping procedures); Swire, supra note 296, at 1325 (calling FISA a “grand 
compromise”). 
 426. See NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 
5–7 (1st ed. 2005) (listing the major legislative programs). 
 427. See Solove, supra note 397, at 1289 (noting that FISA was created for 
gathering intelligence about foreign powers inside the United States). 
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minimization rubric for what was collected pursuant to FISA 
harder to sustain, while the growing need for cooperation and 
information sharing was not contemplated when FISA was en-
acted in 1978. Congress never took the initiative, nor did the 
executive branch, to step back and rewrite FISA from top to 
bottom. As a result, the issues that have plagued FISA have 
lingered, and new ones crop up. Amendments have been made 
piecemeal. 
When Congress amended FISA in 2004 to provide author-
ity to conduct FISA-ordered investigations of so-called “lone 
wolf” terrorist suspects,428 it was billed by many as “the Mous-
saoui fix”—referring to the failure to find that Moussaoui was 
an agent of a foreign power as defined by FISA because he had 
no apparent links to terrorist organizations.429 As amended, the 
“[a]gent of a foreign power” may include any person, other than 
a United States person, who . . . “engages in international ter-
rorism or activities in preparation therefore.”430 In expanding 
FISA to reach these unaffiliated persons, or those for whom the 
foreign agency connection cannot be established by probable 
cause, Congress did not attempt to revisit its 1978 formula for 
identifying targets, an approach that was derived from tradi-
tional concerns with espionage and counterintelligence.431 Logi-
cally, the foreign agency concept could not bear the weight of 
the lone wolf amendment in 2004. If an individual may be tar-
geted for FISA surveillance without any showing of a connec-
tion to any other supposed terrorists, the idea of “agency” sim-
ply does not fit. Congress can call an unaffiliated person an 
agent, but the Act does not require any agency relationship. 
Yet the lone wolf amendment is arguably among the most 
defensible changes to FISA since 1978. On the one hand, recent 
terrorist trends suggest that the lone wolf is the terrorist of our 
time, symbolized by the universal violent jihad rhetoric.432 In-
 
 428. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1)(C) (West 2006). 
 429. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 274. 
 430. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1)(C). Like several other Patriot Act provisions, 
the lone wolf authority was set to expire at the end of 2005, but in March 2006 
Congress extended the sunset date for the lone wolf provision to December 31, 
2009. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-177, § 103, 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A § 1801 
(West 2006)). 
 431. See Solove, supra note 397, at 1289 (noting that FISA was created to 
combat espionage). 
 432. See, e.g., Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., FBI, Remarks at the City Club of 
Cleveland (June 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.fbi 
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dividual terrorists are not a new phenomenon, and examples of 
the lone wolf trace back at least as far as European anarchists 
in the late nineteenth century.433 As Bob Chesney has ex-
plained, internet and encryption technologies have joined with 
the growing violent jihad movement and the partial success of 
efforts to curtail violent jihad organizations to facilitate the 
growth of unaffiliated terrorists and their causes.434 Conduct-
ing surveillance only of those who are foreign agents may miss 
some of the most important targets. 
On the other hand, the extension of FISA processes to un-
affiliated individuals does not solve the problem of coming up 
with sufficient information to meet the FISA probable cause 
requirement.435 Put differently, investigators still have to know 
something about the lone wolf target before they may begin 
FISA surveillance, and learning that modicum of information is 
made no easier by the lone wolf amendment. 
At first blush, the lone wolf provision may appear to permit 
intrusive electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA of an espe-
cially broad array of individuals436—from those who are sus-
pected of buying or selling component materials for weapons of 
mass destruction to those who make donations to apparently 
humanitarian organizations in the Middle East.437 However, 
the lone wolf provision does not apply to U.S. persons438 and it 
requires pursuit of “foreign intelligence” and a connection to 
“international terrorism,” offering protection against targeting 
 
.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller062306.htm) (“Today, terrorist threats may 
come from smaller, more loosely-defined individuals and cells . . . who are in-
spired by a violent jihadist message. These homegrown terrorists may prove to 
be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so.”). 
 433. PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 97–99 (2d ed. 
1986). 
 434. Chesney, supra note 66, at 439–40, 445. 
 435. Kim Taiple, Whispering Wires and the Warrantless Wiretaps: Data 
Mining and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, BULL. ON L. & SEC. (Ctr. on Law 
& Sec., New York, N.Y.), Spring 2006, at 4, 4, 8 n.7. 
 436. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1)(C) (West 2006) (including “any person” 
engaging in terrorist activities). 
 437. See id. § 1801(c) (defining international terrorism activities). 
 438. Id. If it is illogical to call a lone wolf an agent of a foreign power, so too 
does it not make logical sense to exclude U.S. persons from eligibility for lone 
wolf status under FISA. Homegrown terrorism exists, and that terrorism can 
spring from domestic as easily as foreign sources. Once foreign agency is 
eliminated as a real requirement for FISA targeting, the logic of excluding 
U.S. persons evaporates. Our constitutional system may not permit extending 
FISA status to domestic lone wolves, but this is a topic for another article. 
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domestic activities.439 Yet in the post-September 11 era, where 
supposed links to al Qaeda are legion, the tendency to rely on 
FISA to investigate even the most speculative suspicions of a 
connection to international terrorism by lone wolves could turn 
FISA surveillance into a quotidian occurrence. 
Moreover, there may be a tendency to couple the discretion 
to conduct electronic surveillance of lone wolves with early ar-
rest and prosecution. If so, cessation of surveillance may im-
pose opportunity costs and a higher likelihood of acquittals 
than have been the case under the previous foreign agency cri-
teria.440 With this potential risk in mind, the lone wolf change 
may be a practical statutory salve to an important policy chal-
lenge, while it shows that the original FISA framework for tar-
geting electronic surveillance may not be workable now. 
IV.  THE FUTURE PROSPECTS   
Now that the basic survival of FISA has been called into 
question, it is important to consider whether FISA can be re-
stored to its useful role in maintaining the security and civil 
liberties balance. Changes in technology and the dimensions of 
the modern threat of international terrorism have combined to 
complicate finding the appropriate mechanisms that may or 
may not be accommodated inside the FISA scheme. This part of 
the Article will consider whether technological developments 
make it impossible for the TSP to be conducted with FISA pro-
cedures. Next, the Article will offer some tentative conclusions 
concerning the lawfulness of the TSP. Then it will evaluate 
proposed FISA amendments, although in the main they simply 
relegate FISA to an historic dust bin. Whether the TSP could 
be reshaped harmoniously with a still-relevant FISA is a hard 
question, one that I will address briefly in the final two subsec-
tions. 
A. FISA AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY 
When deliberating FISA in 1977, Congress was well aware 
that NSA had engaged in its share of the abuses chronicled by 
the Church Committee and others.441 From 1945 until 1975, 
NSA received copies of millions of international telegrams sent 
 
 439. Id. §§ 1801(b)–(c). 
 440. Chesney, supra note 66, at 427. 
 441. S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 34 n.39 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3936 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-774, pt. 3, at 733 (1976)). 
BANKS_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM 
2007] THE DEATH OF FISA 1275 
 
to, through, or from the United States.442 NSA intended Opera-
tion SHAMROCK to obtain telegrams of foreign targets for for-
eign intelligence purposes.443 With the assistance of commercial 
telegraph companies and without obtaining any kind of judicial 
warrant, NSA had access to as many as 150,000 telegrams per 
month, including those of U.S. citizens who were not in any 
way targeted for foreign intelligence and who reasonably ex-
pected their communications to be private.444 When considering 
FISA, however, Congress expressly declined to extend FISA 
procedures to NSA surveillance activities at least in part be-
cause of then-recent enhancements in oversight of NSA pro-
vided by presidential executive orders and through classified 
Attorney General procedures.445 In addition, Congress took 
note of the “particularly difficult conceptual and technical prob-
lems” in regulating NSA, and it opted to leave NSA untouched 
until separate legislation could be considered.446 
The modern NSA story is in part about the supposed leap-
frogging of technology. The story is familiar. The technologies 
of surveillance and its evasion change rapidly. The bad guys 
keep up with them, and the government lags behind, always 
playing catch up.447 “NSA does not ‘engage in wiretapping’”; its 
electronic surveillance is referred to as “signals intelligence” or 
SIGINT.448 “NSA intercepts entire streams of electronic com-
munications containing millions of calls and e-mails,” and 
screens them through computers that search for key words or 
phrases, telephone numbers, or Internet addresses.449 Data 
that is identified as worthy of further investigation is generated 
by the computers, and then forwarded to NSA personnel.450 Of 
course, the immense volume of electronic communication in the 
world today is such that NSA collects only a small portion of it. 
Some of what is collected is in foreign languages, and some is 
 
 442. S. REP. NO. 94-774, pt. 3, at 738, 740. 
 443. Id. at 740.  
 444. Id.  
 445. S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 34 n.40, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3904, 3936; H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 21 (1978). 
 446. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 71–72 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3904, 4040–41. 
 447. But see James Bamford, Big Brother Is Listening, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Apr. 2006, at 65, 69 (describing how the NSA attempts to keep up 
with new technologies). 
 448. Id. at 66. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
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encrypted, while technical issues limit the capabilities of NSA 
computers to find all the desired identified markers.451 Accord-
ingly, NSA must establish priorities for its collection activities. 
Is FISA an impediment to the government in the technol-
ogy race? One part of the NSA program, first reported by the 
media in May 2006, apparently consists of collecting meta-data, 
information about communications, but not the contents of 
those communications.452 NSA collects the phone numbers or e-
mail addresses and the time and day of communications be-
tween sets of numbers or addresses.453 Computers then sift 
through the billions of pieces of data and cross reference them 
with information databases in order to identify persons for fur-
ther investigation.454 
The FISA definition of “electronic surveillance” extends to 
some non-content information, and thus even the indiscrimi-
nate data mining program run by NSA may require a FISA ap-
plication and order before it is performed, or, on an emergency 
basis, an application within seventy-two hours of approval by 
the Attorney General.455 Attorney General Edward Levi testi-
fied in 1975 that FISA should include provisions for the ap-
proval of “program[s] of surveillance” for foreign intelligence 
when there are no “specifically predetermined targets” and 
where “the efficiency of a warrant requirement would be mini-
mal.”456 Of course, Congress enacted FISA without such a pro-
vision and the compromise that became FISA included a con-
sidered judgment that only individualized consideration of 
applications for secret surveillance to collect foreign intelli-
gence would be prescribed. 
One additional problem with the TSP is that NSA com-
puters do not know who placed the calls or sent the messages, 
nor do they know the contents of those communications. How 
 
 451. See id. at 69 (“[The NSA’s offices] at Crypto City also houses the na-
tion’s largest collection of powerful computers, advanced mathematicians, and 
skilled language experts.”). 
 452. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, 
USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A; John O’Neil, Bush Says U.S. Spying Is Not 
Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A1 (describing the program and its 
description by USA Today). 
 453. See O’Neil, supra note 452. 
 454. See Harris, supra note 300, at 48. 
 455. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f ), 1805(e), 1805(f )(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2004). 
 456. 152 CONG. REC. S2340–01 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Specter) (discussing and citing Attorney General Levi’s testimony before the 
Church Committee on U.S. Intelligence Activities). 
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and based on what criteria does someone demonstrate probable 
cause or even reasonable suspicion to justify targeted surveil-
lance that triggers FISA? Kim Taipale proposes “the electronic 
surveillance equivalent of a Terry457 stop”—in this case “an au-
thorized period for follow-up monitoring or investigation of ini-
tial suspicion derived from automated monitoring.”458 Taipale’s 
reasonable suspicion standard would form the basis for the 
judgment either to discontinue or continue the automated 
monitoring at this early stage. If the monitoring produces prob-
able cause of foreign agency (or lone wolf status), a traditional 
FISA process could be launched by NSA and the Department of 
Justice.459 Taipale does not suggest that programmatic meas-
ures be used indiscriminately in search of terrorist activities. 
Instead, officials should direct these techniques “against known 
or reasonably suspected foreign terrorist communication 
sources,” sources not subject to FISA or a traditional law en-
forcement warrant, and employ them to “automate the process 
of looking for connections, relationships, and patterns for fur-
ther follow-up investigation.”460 Taipale offers examples—“Abu 
Musab Zarqawi’s cell phone number or a known al Qa’ida 
communication network in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Ham-
burg.”461 In a similar vein, Judge Richard Posner laments that, 
while FISA has value for monitoring known terrorists, “it is 
hopeless as a framework for detecting terrorists.”462 Posner ar-
gues that the FISA requirement of probable cause of foreign 
agency before electronic surveillance may be approved is of no 
help “when the desperate need is to find out who is a terror-
ist.”463 Yet what kind of rule-based program could permit sur-
veillance in the circumstances of concern to Taipale and Judge 
Posner that would consist of anything other than the unilateral 
discretion of executive officials and intelligence professionals? 
Who would determine what counts as a suspected foreign ter-
rorist communication source for these purposes, and what cri-
 
 457. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (permitting police to detain a sus-
pect for a reasonable period without probable cause to arrest). 
 458. Taipale, supra note 435, at 1, 5–6. 
 459. Id. at 7. 
 460. Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing 
Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 1–5 (2006) 
(statement of Kim Taipale, Executive Dir., Ctr. for Advanced Studies in Sci. & 
Tech. Policy). 
 461. Taipale, supra note 435, at 9 n.15. 
 462. Posner, supra note 336. 
 463. Id. 
BANKS_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM 
1278 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1209 
 
teria would be used to decide whether and how to continue fol-
low-up investigations? 
B. IS THE TSP LAWFUL? 
At this writing, a few legal conclusions about the TSP may 
be at least tentatively drawn. First, the NSA has, by the public 
admissions of administration officials, conducted the foreign in-
telligence “electronic surveillance” that is subject to FISA, tak-
ing into account the changes in technology since 1978.464 Sec-
ond, although the President may have had Commander-in-
Chief Clause authority to engage in a range of surveillance ac-
tivities incident to conducting a lawful war, in the absence of 
congressional legislation limiting such discretion, the Supreme 
Court has consistently upheld the authority of Congress to 
limit that authority.465 In this context, Congress intended to 
foreclose the authority the President might have previously had 
under the Constitution to conduct such surveillance without 
statutory authority.466 The same section of FISA also forecloses 
implying foreign intelligence electronic surveillance authority 
in any other statute—only a clear authorization in a statute 
subsequent to FISA could overcome the original preclusion.467 
The administration has argued that the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force (AUMF)468 permits the NSA surveillance, 
extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s determination that the 
AUMF authorized the use of military detention in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld.469 The AUMF argument could fail on the context dis-
tinctions between detention of those captured on a battlefield 
and electronic surveillance of Americans inside the United 
States. The distinctions matter less, however, than the stark 
history of the immediate post-September 11 period. At the 
same time that Congress passed the AUMF, it was considering 
versions of what later became the Patriot Act. Among the most 
 
 464. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f )(1),(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2004); see Gonzales, Geor-
getown Remarks, supra note 316.  
 465. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 
542 U.S. 466, 473–74, 485 (2004); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 585–89 (1952); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79 
(1804). 
 466. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2004). 
 467. See Banks supra note 16, at 1153–58. 
 468. Authorization of Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
 469. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 
587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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important features of the Patriot Act were those that amended 
FISA to provide greater tools for the government in the war on 
terrorism.470 It is difficult to conclude that the AUMF permit-
ted electronic surveillance inside the United States beyond 
what Congress was simultaneously revising in FISA. Apart 
from its questionable application to electronic surveillance in-
side the United States, the AUMF should not be read to over-
come the “exclusivity” provision of FISA. The comprehensive-
ness of FISA is reinforced by the section that permits electronic 
surveillance without approval by the FISC for fifteen days im-
mediately following a declaration of war.471 
The stronger constitutional argument for the administra-
tion is that Article II permits the President to authorize war-
rantless surveillance of Americans inside the United States to 
gather information about terrorist activities.472 Two courts of 
appeal so held before FISA was enacted.473 Now, however, the 
constitutional question is whether FISA is unconstitutional in 
restricting the President’s authority to authorize warrantless 
surveillance.474 Congress enacted FISA pursuant to its Com-
merce Clause authority to regulate wire communications be-
tween states and between nations.475 FISA is also an exercise of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, because it serves to “carry[] 
into execution” other national security powers of Congress and 
also because it reaches NSA (part of the Department of De-
fense) incident to its power “[t]o make Rules for the Govern-
 
 470. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 201–202, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001) 
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2000)) (expanding law enforcement surveil-
lance authorities to reach terrorism-related activities); id. §§ 203(b), (c), 115 
Stat. 272, 280–81 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510, 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (2000)) (au-
thorizing information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agen-
cies); id. § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000)) (author-
izing roving wiretaps); id. §§ 209, 210, 212, 115 Stat. 272, 283–86 (amending 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2702, 2703 (2000)) (allowing access to wire and electronic 
communications); id. §§ 214, 215, 115 Stat. 272, 286–88 (amending 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1842, 1843, 1861, 1862 (2000)) (limiting pen register and trap and trace au-
thority and access to business records of United States persons); id. § 218, 115 
Stat. 272, 291 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2000)) (change in the purpose 
standard). 
 471. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West 2006). 
 472. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 473. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605–08 (3d Cir. 1974); United 
States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 474. See Statement of David S. Kris, supra note 313 (applying the separa-
tion of powers balancing and concluding that “a lot turns on the facts”). 
 475. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. 
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ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”476 Does 
FISA unconstitutionally restrict the President’s national secu-
rity authority? The answer turns on the facts of the TSP, which 
are not publicly available. If General Hayden describes the pro-
gram accurately, the administration made a stark choice to cir-
cumvent the FISA probable cause and judicial approval proc-
esses for a lower threshold without judicial involvement. 
Unless something less than probable cause to believe that the 
target is a foreign agent is demanded because of changes in 
surveillance technology, existing judicial precedent would not 
support the TSP.477 
In the wake of the revelations of the TSP, instead of chas-
tising the administration for acting outside an inter-branch 
system for implementing one of the most important national 
security measures of our time, Congress may be on the brink of 
gutting what remains of the FISA system. 
C. PROPOSALS TO AMEND FISA 
Most of the proposals to amend FISA generated after the 
TSP story broke would make radical changes in the law. The 
bills favored by the administration would repeal the FISA ex-
clusivity provision and its attendant criminal penalties, thus 
making it optional for the administration to seek an order from 
the FISC for electronic surveillance inside the United States 
against United States persons.478 This is, of course, the heart of 
the 1978 compromise—subjecting electronic surveillance to the 
terms of the FISA deal in every instance.479 Between FISA’s 
enactment in 1978 and September 11, Attorneys General is-
sued forty seven emergency authorizations under FISA.480 In 
the first eighteen months after September 11, the Attorney 
General authorized more than 170 emergency authorizations 
 
 476. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 477. See Banks supra note 16, at 1181–84. 
 478. See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORIST SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT OF 2006: S. 3931 AND TITLE II OF S. 3929, THE TERRORIST 
TRACKING, IDENTIFICATION AND PROSECUTION ACT OF 2006 at 8–9 (2006). 
 479. See Statement of Former National Security Officials, Sept. 25, 2006, 
http://www.cdt.org/security/20060927officials.pdf (expressing opposition to 
proposal to eliminate the exclusivity provision of FISA and signed by former 
FBI Directors and Counsel, former CIA Counsel, Department of Justice offi-
cials). 
 480. Dan Eggen & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., U.S. Steps Up Secret Surveillance, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2003, at A7. 
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for electronic surveillance or search.481 To provide an explicit 
escape from FISA for the executive branch would likely curtail 
significantly the FISC oversight that emergency applications 
currently receive. 
Despite General Hayden’s claims that the TSP is narrowly 
focused on targets that are reasonably suspected of terrorist 
links and is not a drag net or massive data mining program, 
proposals were made to amend FISA to authorize “program-
matic approvals of cutting-edge technologies—including auto-
mated monitoring of suspected terrorist communications.”482 
Kim Taipale argues that FISA should be amended so that its 
definition of “electronic surveillance” can accommodate orders 
to capture the data and voice communications inside modern 
networks.483 He also acknowledges that the automated moni-
toring that Hayden favors could not be done under FISA as it 
now stands because the intercepts would not meet the probable 
cause standard, even if submitted retroactively under the emer-
gency authority.484 
The administration-backed proposals to amend FISA 
would ratify the TSP by authorizing the FISC to approve “elec-
tronic surveillance programs” inside the United States, for up 
to ninety days, renewable by the FISC.485 Such a program 
would have as a “significant purpose the gathering of foreign 
intelligence information or protecting against international ter-
rorism” where it is “not feasible” to name the targets or loca-
tions, where “flexibility” is required for “effective” surveillance, 
and where an “extended period” of surveillance is contem-
plated.486 The FISC could authorize a program for up to 90 days 
initially, and the court could reauthorize a program for any 
“reasonable” period.487 If the FISC denied an application, the 
Attorney General could reapply or appeal to the FISCR.488 If, 
during an approved program of surveillance, the Attorney Gen-
eral determines that any target of the program could satisfy the 
criteria for individualized consideration under FISA, 
surveillance of that target must be discontinued unless an ap-
 
 481. Id. 
 482. Taipale & Carafano, supra note 336. 
 483. Taipale, supra note 435, at 5–7. 
 484. Id. at 8 n.9. 
 485. BAZAN, supra note 478, at 12–13. 
 486. Id. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
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plication is made, either for continued programmatic surveil-
lance or for an individual order of surveillance from the 
FISC.489 
So styled, this proposal is just as devastating to FISA as 
the repeal of the exclusivity provision. The “program” could be 
used when its sole purpose is the collection of evidence for 
prosecution, and, instead of any version of a probable cause re-
quirement, the program has only to be “reasonably designed” to 
meet its objectives.490 The “electronic surveillance program” 
could become the contemporary general warrant, going beyond 
even what has been publicly described as the TSP. 
The administration-backed proposals also expand the defi-
nition of “agent of a foreign power” to reach non-U.S. persons 
who possess, control, transmit, or receive significant foreign in-
telligence information while in the United States.491 This defi-
nition requires no connection of the target to a terrorist organi-
zation and no showing of a link to international terrorism. Both 
approaches end the collaborative roles of Congress and the ju-
diciary in monitoring intrusive surveillance for foreign intelli-
gence inside the United States, and both restore constitutional 
doubt to one of the administration’s most important counters to 
the threat of terrorism. 
One of the main choke points in FISA is the expansive 
definition of “electronic surveillance.”492 Whether by prescient 
drafting or simple luck, the definition is broad enough to reach 
modern communications technologies, including many of the 
technologies that NSA uses. To avoid becoming ensnared in 
traditional FISA procedures, the 2006 bills the administration 
favors would narrow the previously expansive definition, ena-
bling NSA electronic monitoring or data mining so long as the 
government is not intentionally targeting a United States per-
son inside the United States.493 No order of the FISC would be 
required in these situations, including the vast vacuum 
cleaner-like operations of NSA.494 Warrantless surveillance 
would be expressly permitted under these bills, including any 
communication between a U.S. person and foreign power or 
agent of foreign power, so long as the target is one of the latter 
 
 489. Id. at 3. 
 490. Id. at 6 n.9. 
 491. Id. at 9–10. 
 492. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f ) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 493. BAZAN, supra note 478, at 10–11. 
 494. Id. at 12–15. 
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categories.495 Existing minimization requirements would also 
be eliminated, so that the contents of electronic communica-
tions of U.S. persons could be stored and disseminated without 
statutory restriction.496 
A more modest set of proposals seeks to retain the FISA 
compromise, update some provisions in light of changing tech-
nologies, and assure that the Justice Department has adequate 
resources and personnel to meet the challenges of the FISA 
processes.497 One bill would extend the FISA emergency period 
from seventy two hours to seven days and allow the Attorney 
General to delegate the authority to approve FISA applications 
and to authorize emergency surveillance.498 This bill would also 
require development of improved management systems for fa-
cilitating the FISA application process and authorize hiring 
more staff to meet the demands of regular or emergency appli-
cations under FISA.499 While these measures may stand the 
least chance of enactment in the short term, their enactment 
could actually restore some elements of the FISA compromise. 
As described by Attorney General Gonzales and General 
Hayden, the TSP targets communications involving those for 
whom there is reasonable suspicion of a link to al Qaeda or a 
group of affiliates of al Qaeda.500 Monitoring occurs then only if 
one end of the communication is abroad.501 Although this war-
rantless electronic surveillance itself violates FISA, the leading 
bills would ratify the TSP and then go farther and permit the 
twenty-first century equivalents of general warrants.502 Viewed 
in the aggregate, the bills would authorize NSA to listen in on 
the contents of phone conversations of U.S. citizens inside the 
United States without probable cause or even reasonable suspi-
cion (the “program” must be “reasonably designed” to intercept 
the communications of suspected terrorists) that the person is 
connected in any way to terrorism—even where the conversa-
tion itself has nothing to do with terrorism (interception per-
mitted of a person who “is reasonably believed to have commu-
 
 495. Id. 
 496. Id. at 11–12. 
 497. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Oversight and Resource Enhance-
ment Act of 2006, S. 4051, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006). 
 498. Id. § 201. 
 499. See id. § 102. 
 500. See Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 322. 
 501. Id. 
 502. See BAZAN supra note 478, at 12–13. 
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nication with or be associated with” a suspected terrorist).503 
Because the purpose of the warrantless surveillance program 
may be to “protect against international terrorism,” it could be 
employed when the sole objective is to build evidence for prose-
cution.504 In other words, the bills permit wholesale eavesdrop-
ping. 
D. CAN FISA BE SAVED? 
It is difficult from this vantage point—thirty years out—to 
understand that FISA may have been the best possible accom-
modation of the conflict between national security and civil lib-
erties when it comes to surveillance. It is unrealistic to expect a 
model like FISA to last forever or for it to remain immune from 
the need for revisions and updates. Congress first amended 
FISA in 1994, when it added physical search authority through 
several provisions that set up parallel processes to those in 
place for electronic surveillance.505 Pen register, trap and trace, 
and business records acquisition were added to the FISA proc-
esses in 1998,506 while less extensive revisions were made to 
the definition of “agent of a foreign power” in 1999 and to tar-
geting language in 2000.507 
The 2001 Patriot Act did more than change the foreign in-
telligence “purpose” requirement in seeking to increase the 
sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information. In 
more ways than one, the Patriot Act foretold the death of FISA. 
In the emergency atmosphere that engulfed Congress after 
September 11, a hastily considered set of fundamental changes 
to FISA was enacted, buffered by the fact that many were sub-
ject to a four-year sunset.508 Although the “significant purpose” 
amendment was chosen for more extensive consideration in 
this Article, the theme developed here could have been 
 
 503. Id. at 6 n.9. 
 504. See id. at 3. 
 505. Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423 (2001).  
 506. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
272, 112 Stat. 2396 (1998). 
 507. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-
567, § 602, 114 Stat. 2831, 2851–53 (2000); Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, § 601, 113 Stat. 1606, 1619 (1999). 
 508. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001); 
see, e.g., Patricia Bellia, The “Lone Wolf” Amendment and the Future of For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425, 429 n.31 (2005) (de-
scribing FISA’s sunset provisions). 
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sketched using the roving wiretaps provision,509 the enhanced 
pen register and trap and trace authorities,510 or the expansion 
of the national security letters and document production au-
thorities to reach “any tangible thing.”511 
After a modest expansion of information sharing authority 
in FISA by the Homeland Security Act of 2002,512 the 2004 in-
telligence reform legislation significantly expanded FISA by 
adding the “lone wolf ” amendment to “agent of a foreign 
power.”513 As the sunsets loomed in 2005, Congress approved 
short-term extensions until enacting the USA PATRIOT Reau-
thorization Act of 2005 in March 2006.514 Fourteen of the 
sixteen provisions due to sunset were made permanent in the 
Act, while the roving wiretaps, “tangible thing,” and “lone wolf” 
provisions were extended until the end of 2009.515 
Even if Congress enacts none of the proposals to amend 
FISA being considered at the end of the 109th Congress, it is 
fair to say that the compromise collapsed with September 11. 
Perhaps the richest example of how the emergency atmospher-
ics worked to undo the compromise that served well for more 
than two decades is the review of the Patriot Act purpose 
change by the FISC and the FISCR. At the time, that group of 
seven FISC judges probably understood FISA mechanics, proc-
esses, and the delicate balancing of interests it represented bet-
ter than anyone. In the face of the emergency and the statutory 
change, the judges did their best to preserve the central pur-
pose of FISA while respecting the changes made in the Patriot 
Act. The FISC opinion reached a fair accommodation of the 
competing interests, even though the court’s emphasis on com-
plying with the minimization requirements of FISA struck 
many readers, including the FISCR, as not responsive to the 
government’s argument and not as central to their outcome as 
the original purposes of FISA and its reasonableness in light of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 509. Patriot Act, § 206. 
 510. Id. § 214. 
 511. Id. §§ 215, 505; see Schulhofer supra note 163, at 544–61. 
 512. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 898, 116 Stat. 
2258 (2002) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1)). 
 513. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A.  
§ 1801(b)(1)(c) (West 2006)). 
 514. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
 515. Id. § 103, 120 Stat. 195 (2006). 
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Minimization procedures are designed to protect U.S. per-
sons from having what would typically be the inevitable by-
product of indiscriminate electronic surveillance—
communications intercepted that are not foreign intelligence—
from being acquired, retained, or disseminated.516 As the FISC 
saw a FISA future under the proposed OIPR procedures, the 
amount of non-foreign intelligence information that would be 
collected would increase, and the possibility of direction and 
control of a FISA investigation by the Criminal Division meant 
that considerable non-foreign intelligence information would be 
collected, stored, and disseminated.517 In effect, the FISC wor-
ried that FISA would be used to enforce the criminal law, and 
that application of FISA surveillance would be inconsistent 
with the underlying purpose of minimization.518 
Based on the long experience of the FISC judges in work-
ing with FISA and its implementation, their concern with the 
effects of the new procedures on minimization was understand-
able. Particularly since the 1995 procedures promulgated by 
Attorney General Reno heightened the sensitivities of FISC 
judges to inappropriate uses of FISA in criminal investigations, 
the court was especially wary of endorsing what could be seen 
as a way to work around the rigors of Title III warrants.519 Yet 
the FISC was, to some extent, a prisoner of its limited perspec-
tive and its symbiotic relationship with OIPR. Without mean-
ingful oversight by Congress or other Article III courts, the 
FISC was “coached” by OIPR after 1995 to elevate the wall and 
information screening procedures beyond the statutory re-
quirements.520 FISA explained the prohibition on the Criminal 
Division directing or controlling FISA surveillance, but it did 
not justify the restrictive screening walls that stood in the way 
of effective cooperation and coordination. Thus, the 2002 FISC 
decision puzzled many observers. If the proposed OIPR proce-
dures would enable prosecutors to use FISA when obtaining Ti-
tle III warrants was too difficult, the more visible and concrete 
legal problem was that the purpose of the investigation was no 
 
 516. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 517. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624–25 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed 
Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id. at 619–24. 
 520. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78. 
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longer to collect foreign intelligence, or that the surveillance 
would be undertaken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
It was understandable for the FISCR to rebuke the FISC 
for basing their decision on the FISA minimization require-
ments, and for failing to respond directly to the Patriot Act ar-
guments advanced by the government. As the FISCR construed 
FISA, the minimization requirements allow the dissemination 
for law enforcement purposes of non-foreign intelligence infor-
mation that is evidence of ordinary crimes.521 In addition, the 
FISCR correctly noted that expanding foreign intelligence col-
lection to include evidence of crimes is not the same as direct-
ing a FISA investigation for the purpose of building a criminal 
case.522 In addition, the “chaperone requirement” that the FISC 
fashioned and the FISCR overturned,523 where OIPR was to “be 
invited” to all meetings between the intelligence and criminal 
division staff, was cumbersome and not essential to the preser-
vation of the foreign intelligence essence of FISA. 
Still, it was not “quite puzzling,” as the FISCR proclaimed, 
that the pre-Patriot Act Justice Department read FISA “as lim-
iting the Department’s ability to obtain FISA orders if it in-
tended to prosecute the targeted agents—even for foreign intel-
ligence crimes.”524 As noted above, the FISCR conflated what 
FISA surveillance is used for with the purpose for seeking FISA 
procedures. Even though the foreign agency definition is, as the 
FISCR noted, “grounded on criminal conduct.”525 That OIPR 
misconstrued the procedures and applied them in a skewed 
fashion to erect barriers to sharing information is highly unfor-
tunate, but it is not a justification for eliminating the central 
protection against law enforcement direction and control of the 
FISA processes. FISA requires a significant foreign intelligence 
purpose before surveillance may be approved by the FISC. It 
was that assurance that the FISC was understandably seeking 
to protect. 
In any case, reversal of the FISC was an overreaction, and 
the rhetoric of crisis and fear appeared to outstrip calm reflec-
tion in its opinion. In their first ever consideration of a FISA 
matter, the three judges misunderstood the historical distinc-
tions about primary purpose that FISA case law created. The 
 
 521. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (2000); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736. 
 522. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735–36. 
 523. Id. at 720. 
 524. Id. at 723. 
 525. Id. 
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FISCR also misidentified the source of the information-sharing 
problem—the cultures and traditions of intelligence and law 
enforcement, not FISA—and, in doing so, overturned a thought-
ful effort by the full and experienced FISC to preserve the fun-
damental FISA values. By suggesting that there may be consti-
tutional problems with FISA in hamstringing executive power 
if it were read as the FISC interpreted it,526 the FISCR drove a 
stake at the heart of the FISA compromise, while failing to stop 
the Justice Department from unraveling one of the principal 
understandings that helped build FISA in the beginning. 
The FISCR reasonably feared that it may be impossible to 
separate the criminal conspiracy from the terrorist activities 
elements of a foreign organization.527 Yet the court gave too lit-
tle credit to the tendency of potential abuses of the secret FISA 
authorities. While the need to share information and even to 
combine law enforcement and intelligence investigative teams 
may be reasonable, it does not follow that the Ashcroft guide-
lines option of having the criminal team initiate, direct, and 
control a FISA investigation is justified.528 
Ironically, the differences between the pre- and post-
Patriot Act versions of FISA were not that great, at least not 
regarding the purpose requirement.529 Most of the time it will 
be possible to ascribe a “significant” foreign intelligence pur-
pose in making an application to the FISC where the govern-
ment is also developing a criminal case.530 The differences be-
tween the 1995 FISC guidelines, (as written, not as applied) 
and what the Justice Department proposed in 2002 would 
likely matter in only a few instances.531 Following the current 
counter-terrorism prevention paradigm, the government may 
decide to break up what it believes to be a terrorist conspiracy 
by prosecuting a collateral crime, such as immigration viola-
tions or credit card fraud. If the criminal evidence is collected 
during FISA surveillance, may it be used to prosecute, even 
though the crimes are unrelated to the foreign intelligence or 
counter-terrorism purpose of the surveillance? Most of the time 
 
 526. Id. at 731. 
 527. Id. at 736. 
 528. See Schulhofer, supra note 163, at 540. 
 529. Banks, supra note 16, at 1177–81. 
 530. The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Proc-
ess, Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 126 (2002) (state-
ment of David S. Kris, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
 531. Banks, supra note 16, at 1191. 
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the collateral crime—credit card fraud, for example—will be 
connected to the terrorist activities and will thus present an 
easy “significant purpose” determination in the FISA certifica-
tion. If, however, the strategy at the time the FISA application 
is made is to find the evidence of crimes unrelated to the for-
eign intelligence—a suspected terrorist who consumes child 
pornography, for example—FISA should not be available for 
the surveillance because the law enforcement and foreign intel-
ligence interests are not intertwined, and the enforcement pro-
cedures should be available for investigation and prosecution of 
the crimes. If some unrelated collateral crimes are discovered 
later, during FISC-approved foreign intelligence collection, 
then the criminal evidence should be available in a prosecution. 
Although a “significant” foreign intelligence purpose is present 
in both examples, the purpose of the FISA processes would be 
subverted if the unrelated collateral crimes strategy is allowed 
to direct and control FISA surveillance. 
1. Minimization Reforms? 
Consistent with the prevention strategy, it would be possi-
ble to amend the minimization requirements in FISA to permit 
more real time information sharing between foreign intelli-
gence and law enforcement investigators. As FISA minimiza-
tion is now prescribed, criminal evidence obtained through 
FISA procedures disseminated for law enforcement purposes is 
evidence of a crime “which has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed.”532 Minimization thus requires that responsible of-
ficials make an a priori or contemporaneous decision that the 
collected information is evidence of a crime. The Sarkissian, 
Duggan, Hammoud, and Lakhani examples in the introduction 
to this Article are model applications of permissible sharing of 
law enforcement information consistent with the minimization 
requirements.533 In Sarkissian, Duggan, and Lakhani, the col-
lection of foreign intelligence led to the evidence of the 
crimes.534 Once the crimes were discovered, the FISA surveil-
lance came to an end. In Hammoud, the cigarette smuggling 
and support for Hezbollah investigations overlapped, but the 
FISA surveillance was reviewed by the courts and was found to 
 
 532. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (2000). 
 533. See supra text accompanying notes 42–55. 
 534. See supra text accompanying notes 42–55. 
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be undertaken for the primary purpose of collecting foreign in-
telligence.535 
In other situations, investigators might not know the intel-
ligence or law enforcement value of collected information at the 
time it is collected. Investigators may wish to continue collect-
ing foreign intelligence with FISA procedures while at the same 
time continuing to collect what may amount to evidence of a 
collateral crime—not a national security crime—and the mini-
mization rule would not permit the sharing of that information 
with law enforcement. Simply requiring that officials seek a Ti-
tle III warrant at that point in an investigation may not be a 
practical option if the result would be to blow the cover off the 
FISA collection, through delayed notice to the target. Professor 
Yoo argues that surveillance should be permitted “where there 
is a reasonable chance that terrorists will appear, or communi-
cate, even if we do not know their specific identities.”536 Yoo of-
fers an example: 
What if we knew that there was a 50 percent chance that terrorist 
would use a certain communications pipeline, like e-mail accounts on 
a popular Pakistani service, but that most of the communications on 
that channel would not be linked to terrorism? A FISA-based ap-
proach would prevent computers from searching through that channel 
for the keywords or names that might suggest terrorist communica-
tions, because we would have no specific al Qaeda suspects, and thus 
no probable cause. Rather than individualized suspicion, searching 
for terrorists will depend on playing the probabilities, just as road-
blocks or airport screenings do.537 
Professor Yoo maintains that “[i]ndividualized suspicion 
does not make sense when the purpose of intelligence is to take 
action, such as killing or capturing members of the enemy.”538 
Would Professor Yoo extend this model to electronic surveil-
lance inside the United States? Under his model, are targets of 
foreign intelligence surveillance “members of the enemy”? Pro-
fessor Yoo might endorse Kim Taipale’s suggestion of an elec-
tronic Terry stop as a means of accommodating the interest in 
individualized suspicion.539 However, if Yoo’s premise is ac-
cepted, who decides when to forego individualized suspicion, 
what criteria guide such a decision, and what should be done 
 
 535. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). 
 536. YOO, supra note 206, at 111–12. 
 537. Id. at 112. 
 538. Id. 
 539. See supra text accompanying notes 457–71. 
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with the collected intelligence? Is the inevitable high rate of 
false positives and accompanying chilling of protected expres-
sion and individual privacy worth the gain in surveillance dis-
cretion?540 
2. An Exclusionary Rule for FISA? 
Alternatively, minimization could be better managed by 
the FISC if the federal courts were to enforce a species of exclu-
sionary rule, where the government would be prevented from 
using FISA-obtained information as evidence in a prosecution 
of a target for a so-called collateral crime—one having nothing 
to do with terrorism or national security—if none of the evi-
dence demonstrated that the criminal conduct had any connec-
tion to terrorism or national security.541 If this form of use limit 
were faithfully observed and enforced, the damage done to the 
purpose rule by the Patriot Act and the FISCR decision could 
be repaired, after the fact. Instead of the ex ante purpose rule, 
the use limit would accomplish the same end ex post.542 The po-
tential for privacy invasions by investigators using FISA inap-
propriately would remain, but a check on the utility of the mis-
use would discourage the original invasion.543 Elsewhere I 
proposed the hypothetical of “an international terrorist [who] is 
also a drug dealer—not to support terrorist activities but to 
support himself.”544 If FISA surveillance is obtained and evi-
dence of the drug dealing derived from the FISA surveillance is 
offered as evidence, it should be excluded under this approach, 
while the same material would be admissible if the target is 
charged with using his narcotics proceeds to materially support 
terrorism. In addition, a use limit would, unlike FISA minimi-
zation, be based on Fourth Amendment reasonableness and not 
on the terms of FISA, thus enabling the protections of the use 
limit to be enjoyed by targets who are not U.S. persons.545 
 
 540. A full consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
They are explored generally in MCMAHON, supra note 37, passim. See also 
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 passim (2002). 
 541. See Matthew R. Hall, Constitutional Regulation of National Security 
Investigation: Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 61, 102–03 (2006) (proposing such a rule, using the sale of narcotics as an 
example of the unrelated charge). 
 542. Id. at 103. 
 543. Id.  
 544. Banks, supra note 16, at 1179. 
 545. Hall, supra note 541, at 109. 
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If some sort of ex post use limit is employed to lessen the 
minimization task and shore up the weakened purpose re-
quirement in FISA, would the cure be worse than the disease, 
i.e., would the use limit stand in the way of effective national 
security or counter-terrorism investigations that do not result 
in criminal prosecutions? For example, if FISA surveillance un-
covers information ultimately insufficient to build a criminal 
case related to terrorism, but obtains enough information to 
deport the target for a visa overstay or to prosecute for an unre-
lated crime, the target might raise the use limit in an eventual 
deportation hearing or criminal proceeding through the ex 
parte, in camera hearing to suppress the evidence. Conceivably, 
the executive could be forced to expose intelligence sources and 
methods, or simply to alert the target to the nature of the FISA 
investigation. These are not trivial concerns, but their resolu-
tion, if a use limit were accepted and utilized, would likely par-
allel the outcomes of challenges by criminal defendants under 
the pre-Patriot Act primary purpose standard—the courts uni-
formly upheld the FISA surveillance with a high level of defer-
ence to the executive branch and the FISC.546 
3. Improved Oversight of FISA Activities 
Because Congress and the courts have not provided mean-
ingful oversight of FISA activities, the FISC has served an im-
portant oversight capacity in addition to its responsibility to 
review applications for surveillance. In 2000, the FISC com-
plained that several applications to the court contained factual 
inaccuracies.547 Thereafter, the FBI developed FISA verifica-
tion procedures to better ensure the accuracy of the facts in 
each FISA application, particularly those concerning the prob-
able cause determination, and the existence and nature of any 
parallel law enforcement processes or prior or ongoing asset re-
lationship involving the target. The procedures require com-
puter database searches and efforts to check the status of the 
target with other units of the FBI.548 When FOIA requests 
 
 546. Id. at 110. 
 547. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620–21 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed 
Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 548. Memorandum from Michael J. Woods, FBI Office of Gen. Counsel, on 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Procedures to Ensure Accuracy of All 
Field Offices (April 5, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ 
doj/fisa/woods.pdf. 
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turned up additional data two years later, the FBI detailed over 
one hundred instances over two years where procedural re-
quirements of FISA may not have been met, such as conducting 
wiretaps that were broader in scope and longer in duration 
than approved by the FISC.549 This recent record reinforces the 
importance that Congress should attach to oversight of the 
FISA processes. Whether Congress provides greater oversight 
itself or through the FISC, it should not be left to the discretion 
of the Department of Justice to decide whether and how to use 
the FISA processes.550 
E. REVISIONS TO FISA TO ACCOMMODATE THE TSP 
During a September 15, 2006 news conference, President 
Bush commented on the bills in Congress that would amend 
FISA to account for the NSA surveillance program. One ques-
tioner asked about the “eavesdropping program.” The President 
responded: “[Y]es, the illegal eavesdropping program you 
wanted to call it . . . IEP, as opposed to TSP.”551 
To those who doubt that the technology-challenged Con-
gress is capable of legislating an effective system for surveil-
lance of would-be terrorists, recall that the Bush administra-
tion specifically stated in 2001 that the Patriot Act allowed 
“surveillance of all communications used by terrorists,” and 
that the Act makes us able to “better meet the technological 
challenges posed by this proliferation of communications tech-
nology.”552 In March 2006, when the Patriot reauthorization 
was completed and most of the sunsets repealed, the Justice 
Department reiterated that the Patriot Act provisions “brought 
the federal government’s ability to investigate . . . into the 
modern era—by modifying our investigative tools to reflect 
modern technologies.”553 So far as all but a handful of members 
 
 549. Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Report Cites Intelligence-Rule Violations 
by F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A21. 
 550. See Schulhofer, supra note 163, at 541–42 (urging greater FISA over-
sight of individual cases by FISC judges as well as public and congressional 
oversight). 
 551. President’s News Conference, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1617 
(Sept. 15, 2006). 
 552. Remarks on Signing of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 2 PUB. PA-
PERS 1307 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
 553. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: USA PATRIOT ACT IMPROVEMENT 
AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005, No. 06-113 (Mar. 2, 2006), available at 
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of Congress knew, it had met the technological demands of the 
executive branch for effective surveillance authorities. 
Nonetheless, some variant of the TSP program could be ac-
commodated after changes to FISA that would not rip apart the 
fabric of the Act. First, FISA could be amended to permit sur-
veillance from “within the United States” of the electronic 
communications of an agent of a foreign power abroad who is 
talking to a U.S. person. Modern communications packets of 
foreign-to-foreign calls or e-mails of non-U.S. persons may pass 
through the United States as a function of the way that tech-
nology operates.554 The revelation that NSA has been doing just 
that in the TSP, with the cooperation of telecommunications 
providers, lets those who we might intercept know something 
about U.S. capabilities that probably was not known—that 
even wholly foreign communications may pass through massive 
switches in the U.S. network. Even though the element of sur-
prise has been eliminated, the location of the switch where the 
interception of electronic communication by an agent of a for-
eign power takes place should not affect its legality. 
Second, in situations where the government is targeting 
the foreign communications of a non-U.S. person abroad, FISA 
does not apply, but if the target calls the United States, the 
surveillance must be turned off. While amending FISA to ex-
clude from its coverage such surveillance when incident to an 
ongoing electronic surveillance of a non-U.S. person abroad 
means that an agency could listen in on innocent persons inside 
the United States,555 such a risk might be small in return for 
the gain to the overall foreign intelligence gained in the surveil-
lance. 
Third, the FISA minimization requirements could be made 
more flexible. The fact that the FISC and FISCR had funda-
mentally different conceptions of what minimization was de-
signed to accomplish in FISA may be reason enough to revisit 
its objectives. More important, minimization should take into 
account the contemporary reality that the information collected 
cannot always be pigeonholed a priori in a binary world as for-
eign intelligence or criminal violation evidence. Assuming con-
tinued government interest in prosecuting terrorism conspira-
 
 554. Taipale, supra note 435, at 4. 
 555. See Legislative Proposals to Update the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (FISA), Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 38–39 (2006) (state-
ment of James X. Dempsey, Policy Dir., Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.). 
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cies that are inchoate,556 a FISA investigation that happens to 
turn up collateral crimes—where seeking a Title III warrant is 
not a practical alternative in the midst of foreign intelligence 
collection—could incorporate minimization procedures that are 
more flexible in terms of the timing of the acquisition, reten-
tion, and dissemination of law enforcement information. A 
twenty-first century FISA might tolerate a looser minimization 
procedure, with review and oversight mechanisms. 
Fourth, in the FISA emergency procedures, one objection 
made by the Bush administration in defending the TSP was 
that the FISA procedures required that applications and sup-
porting material for every instance of FISA targeting had to be 
completed before initiating the surveillance, even though the 
FISC approval process could wait seventy two hours. The FISA 
procedures could be streamlined to accommodate the need for 
speed and efficiency. A senior official could be made responsible 
for asserting a good-faith belief that the FISA targeting criteria 
exist regarding the targets in question. The emergency author-
ity would expire, as it now does, at the end of seventy-two 
hours or when it has been determined by the Attorney General 
or the FISC that the FISA requirements have not been met.557 
Of course, traditional judicial review of the TSP may yet 
invalidate the program as a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
or FISA. If FISA is not amended to authorize or ratify the TSP 
in some fashion, a court should enjoin the program as a FISA 
violation. In the alternative, warrantless electronic surveillance 
of United States citizens inside the United States constitutes a 
clear Fourth Amendment violation. One problem in litigating 
the TSP is that it is impossible to know, without access to clas-
sified information, whether the program engages in such sur-
veillance. Based on the statements of General Hayden and At-
torney General Gonzales, however, it appears that NSA listens 
in on the contents of phone and e-mail communications where 
one participant may be a U.S. citizen inside the United States. 
If so, the only Fourth Amendment doctrine that could conceiva-
bly justify the program is the so-called “special needs” doctrine, 
excepting from the warrant and probable cause requirements 
 
 556. See generally Chesney, supra note 66 (discussing the continuum of in-
choate terrorism conduct that may be prosecuted). 
 557. The Justice Department reported considerable progress in streamlin-
ing the FISA application and review processes, and in reducing the time 
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in situations where the government has “special needs” above 
and beyond ordinary law enforcement. As has been argued 
elsewhere, the special needs cases have sustained drunk-
driving checkpoints and drug testing in schools, programs that 
are standardized and relatively non-intrusive.558 But the doc-
trine has never supported the highly discretionary and intru-
sive likes of the TSP. When the FISCR relied on the “special 
needs” cases to support the Ashcroft procedures lowering the 
wall,559 the judges did so in the context of a system that is 
based on individualized suspicion and prior judicial approval. 
TSP contains neither protection. 
In the first decision to reach the merits of the TSP, Judge 
Anna Diggs Taylor ruled that the TSP violates FISA, the sepa-
ration of powers, and the First and Fourth Amendments.560 Al-
though the analysis in Judge Taylor’s opinion was spare, and 
the case is on appeal,561 several other pending cases562 may 
eventually produce a Supreme Court decision on the TSP. 
  CONCLUSION   
So much of the post-September 11 redirection of our 
counter-terrorism law and policy in the United States has been 
based on the impassioned rhetoric of the war on terrorism. Of-
ten forsaking reasoned analysis, careful consideration of costs 
and benefits, and alternative courses of action, our post-
September 11 laws and policies have been developed with a 
sort of bunker mentality, designed to anticipate worst case out-
comes. Consider the statement of Vice President Richard Che-
ney, commenting in the wake of the revelations that a Paki-
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stani group with scientific expertise may wish to export nuclear 
technologies to Muslim nations: 
If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al 
Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a cer-
tainty in terms of our response . . . . It’s not about our analysis, or 
finding a preponderance of evidence . . . . It’s about our response.563 
The prevention policy first announced by Attorney General 
Ashcroft shortly after September 11 is hardly the same as 
treating the one percent chance as certainty, but it is closer to 
policies that treat suspicion as probable cause. What are the 
marginal costs and benefits to our national security of laws and 
policies that base their operational terms on a “one percent 
chance,” or even a reasonable suspicion of a horrific conse-
quence? What values and legal safeguards are lost when tradi-
tional standards of proof and evidence are eschewed in favor of 
action based on suspicion or an indiscriminate data mining 
program? How does a program like TSP serve to disrupt or 
even expose al Qaeda or other would-be terrorists? And to what 
extent do secret surveillance initiatives like TSP corrode the 
democratic values and institutions that we seek to protect from 
terrorism? At a minimum, the unraveling of FISA and emer-
gence of the TSP call into question the virtual disappearance of 
effective oversight of our national security surveillance. The 
Congress and federal courts have become observers of the sys-
tem, not even participants, much less overseers.564 
The circumstances that led to the enactment of FISA 
nearly thirty years ago—a chastened executive, an awakened 
Congress, courts newly willing to protect privacy in electronic 
surveillance settings—may never recur. The imperfect system 
for national security surveillance that FISA codified worked 
reasonably well through the early 1990’s. As terrorism as-
cended in importance as a national security concern and Con-
gress and the President worked to enact new laws criminaliz-
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ing terrorist activities, pressures on the FISA process increased 
and its careful accommodation of foreign intelligence and law 
enforcement interests was ensnared in bureaucratic confusion, 
institutional rivalries, and personal and inter-agency jealous-
ies.565 
When the Patriot Act followed soon after September 11, the 
institutional and bureaucratic barriers to sharing intelligence 
information that contributed to the failure to anticipate the hi-
jackers were misapprehended and translated into a legal 
change to FISA that was showcased as breaking down the wall 
that kept us from preventing the attacks. The ensuing revision 
of Justice Department guidelines and their review by the FISC 
and FISCR struck a serious blow to the essential terms of the 
FISA arrangement—providing a mechanism for secret surveil-
lance with reduced predicates for targeting, in return for a 
commitment that the special process would not be used by 
criminal prosecutors who simply could not meet the traditional 
warrant requirements. Now the fear expressed by the FISC in 
2002—that abuses of FISA could increasingly occur—is not far-
fetched. 
David Kris has pointed out an argument that keeping the 
wall down may enhance civil liberties. Kris reasons that, with 
the wall out of the way, “more DOJ lawyers may become in-
volved in national security investigations. . . . More lawyers 
means more oversight, and lawyer oversight is how [we] pro-
tect[] civil liberties in intelligence.” Second, Kris argued, using 
law enforcement to counter foreign threats is, considering al-
ternative methods available to the government “among the 
most benign. The wall channels government toward more ex-
treme measures.”566 
Kris correctly observes that the Church Committee Report 
concluded that tethering domestic security investigations to a 
legal framework under the supervision of the Attorney General 
was one of the fundamental correctives to the abuses uncov-
ered.567 As FISA, FBI Guidelines, and executive orders were 
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implemented, lawyers closely supervised the gathering of intel-
ligence. According to Kris, the FISA wall kept lawyers in the 
field—those working with criminal investigators—away from 
intelligence investigations. After the FISCR decision, prosecu-
tors in field offices of the Criminal Division and in U.S. Attor-
ney’s Offices have regular access to intelligence investigators. 
Their orientation toward preserving all criminal prosecution 
options makes them especially sensitive to rule violations that 
could affect the criminal case. Thus, Kris argues, “civil liber-
tarians ought to oppose the wall and encourage increased 
prosecutorial involvement in national security investiga-
tions.”568 
Kris is, of course, speculating about the effects of the wall, 
pre- and post-FISCR. Based on its long experience with FISA, 
the 2002 en banc FISC was apparently more concerned with 
potential prosecutorial misuse of the FISA processes to enhance 
the prosecution option than it was with the absence of effective 
legal oversight of the implementation of FISA by intelligence 
professionals in the field. As noted earlier in this Article, the 
pre-certification involvement of legal review in assuring that 
FISA is properly applied in all respects, including that a sig-
nificant purpose of the surveillance is to collect foreign intelli-
gence, is extensive, far more so than the process that attends 
Title III warrant applications. I am inclined to respect the 
judgment of the experienced FISC judges on this important is-
sue. 
Kris’s second claim, that after the fall of the wall, civil lib-
erties are less threatened by the prosecution option more likely 
after the fall of the wall because of the “less gentle” options 
otherwise likely to be taken, is a reminder that our government 
has subjected even United States citizens to military detention 
since 2002. In other words, things could always be worse. To be 
sure, military detention is the greater threat to civil liberties 
than civilian prosecution. While the legal contours of permissi-
ble military detention and adjudication are not fully developed, 
it is highly unlikely that this draconian alternative to civilian 
prosecution would be undertaken on any kind of widespread 
basis. 
The Justice Department has proudly showcased what it 
views as the tremendous benefits from the Patriot Act’s infor-
mation sharing provisions and the lowering of the wall. One 
 
 568. Kris, supra note 566, at 527. 
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example involved the Department’s investigations of suspected 
al Qaeda cell members in Lackawanna, New York, the so-called 
“Lackawanna Six.” The investigation began in the summer of 
2001, based on an anonymous tip delivered to the FBI that lo-
cal Yemeni-Americans might be involved in drug crime and ter-
rorist activities. Initially, FBI “concluded that existing law re-
quired the creation of two separate investigations in order to 
retain the option of using FISA.”569 According to the Depart-
ment, the Patriot Act made clear that information sharing be-
tween the two teams was allowed, which in turn let the crimi-
nal side know that an al Qaeda agent was involved, leading to 
early criminal charges against the six.570 This Article has 
shown that neither the 1978 FISA nor the 2001 FISA, as 
amended by the Patriot Act, stood in the way of simultaneous 
investigations of the same target or targets, in parallel or as 
one team, so long as the purpose of the FISA investigation was 
the collection of foreign intelligence. The wall procedures that 
appeared in 1995 were not required by FISA and even those 
would have permitted the sharing that allegedly could not oc-
cur in the Lackawanna investigation, so long as the Criminal 
Division did not direct or control the FISA investigation.571 
Meanwhile, rapid and accelerating changes in technology 
and in particular the digitization of surveillance and communi-
cations presented Congress and the President with ongoing 
challenges to keep up with and exceed the communications and 
evasion capabilities of adversaries. While FISA was amended 
toward these ends to the apparent satisfaction of the executive 
branch, the administration approved NSA surveillance and the 
TSP. Consistent with the prevention paradigm, the TSP es-
chews probable cause and individualized suspicion and judicial 
 
 569. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT 
ACT AT WORK 3 (July 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/ 
patriot0704.pdf. 
 570. Id. 
 571. In addition to the Lackawanna investigation, the Justice Department 
lists seven other examples “made possible by the USA PATRIOT Act,” Id. at 5. 
In all of them, the increased sharing of information and coordination between 
law enforcement and intelligence officers has resulted from changes in DOJ 
procedures and direction from senior officials, none of which was legally for-
bidden before the Patriot Act and the FISCR decision. The sharing and coordi-
nation contemplated by the 2002 Ashcroft guidelines would have been permit-
ted without the Patriot Act changes. Indeed, the 2002 guidelines prescribe 
policies that sound quite similar to those practiced without the benefit of writ-
ten rules during the OIPR tenure of Mary Lawton. See supra text 
accompanying notes 166–68. 
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and congressional oversight and review, all hallmarks of FISA. 
The extent to which digital capabilities render these central le-
gal instruments obsolete is a complex topic that could only 
briefly be considered in this Article. Whatever the answer to 
this digital revolution, however, it is clear that what remains of 
FISA has been ignored. 
In our legal system, we attach great importance to the 
value of fair processes. In national security law and policy, 
when secrecy has been an important operational requisite, we 
have developed review and oversight processes to help assure 
that unilateral power is not abused. So has it been with FISA. 
In the five years since September 11, those process safeguards 
have largely been lost or overtaken. If FISA is to have any 
meaningful role for the next thirty years, its central terms will 
have to be restored, one way or the other. 
